Expungement, Defamation, and False Light:
Is What Happened Before What Really Happened or
is There a Chance for a Second Act in America?
Doris Del Tosto Brogan*
The book club’s leader ask[ed] what Fitzgerald meant when he said
there are no second acts in American lives. “He [is] saying that the past
is always with us,” replies D’Angelo Barksdale, a middle manager in a
drug-dealing empire . . . “You can say you somebody new. You can give
yourself a whole new story. But what came first is who you really are,
and what happened before is what really happened.”1
“The past is whatever the records and the memories agree
upon . . . [T]he past is whatever the Party chooses to make it. It also
follows that though the past is alterable, it never has been altered in any
specific instance. For when it has been re-created in whatever shape is
needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different
past can ever have existed . . . In Newspeak it is called [D]oublethink.”2
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INTRODUCTION
Once an individual who was convicted of a crime has served her
sentence and satisfied any post-release conditions imposed, she has, as
the saying goes, paid her debt to society and should be able to get on with
her life. But easy access to criminal records by employers, media outlets,
and even nosy neighbors can undermine the individual’s ability to reenter productive society. Responding to arguments that the albatross of a
criminal record is among the most burdensome of the collateral
consequences that follow a criminal charge or conviction, and contributes
significantly to recidivism,3 most states have enacted statutory
3. See, e.g., Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive
Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2015) (“The American criminal justice system often
turns ‘even a minor offense into a life sentence by permanently keeping [ex-offenders] out of a
job.’”); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as
Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
INTER ALIA 11, 11–12 (Nov. 7, 2016), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter/alia/effectiveness-certificates-
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expungement or erasure statutes.4 But “[i]t’s far easier to get a criminal
record than to eradicate one.”5 So even if the court seals a record, or
orders it destroyed or erased,6 the footprints of that record will remain
spread all over the web, just a click away. Indeed, its shadow may even
remain in the official court records ordered to be expunged.7 And, in this
data-driven, information-addicted era, what was once a public record
available only through government sources now will be captured and
made easily accessible in any number of venues not subject to
expungement laws.8 What happens, then, when a news outlet—or even a
relief-collateral-consequences-relief-mechanisms-experimental (citing statistics indicating that
between 70 and 100 million Americans have a criminal record and detailing 44,500 collateral
consequences of criminal convictions such as denial of public housing and disenfranchisement);
see also Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 441–42 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (order granting a
federal certificate of rehabilitation and noting how difficult it is for prospective employers to give
the appropriate weight to an applicant’s past criminal record).
4. See 50-State Guide to Expungement and Sealing Laws, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 13, 2016), http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/01/13/expungement-andsealing-laws/ [hereinafter “50 State Guide to Expungement Laws”] (providing a comprehensive list
of judicial expungement, sealing and set-aside laws in all fifty states); see also Chris Skall, Journey
Out of Neverland: Cori Reform, Commonwealth v. Peter Pon, and Massachusetts’s Emergence as
a National Exemplar for Criminal Record Sealing, 57 B.C. L. REV. 337, 341 (2016) (noting that
“[m]ost states have statutory provisions authorizing courts to seal or expunge records,” but that
states have enacted such provisions “in a disparate and non-uniform fashion”). As noted below,
these statutes provide a variety of remedies and go by a variety of titles. For the purposes of this
Article I will use the terms “expungement” and “expunge” throughout to encompass the range of
remedies, except where it is necessary to make a distinction.
5. Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV.
321, 341 (2015) (quoting Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Fighting to Forget: Long After
Arrests, Criminal Records Live On, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 25, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/fighting-to-forget-long-after-arrests-records-live-on-1419564612) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the Internet age, damage to employment opportunity is not limited to criminal
records. See The Internet Never Forgets, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Aug. 18, 2008),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-internet-never-forgets/ (recounting an instance
when a job applicant sent a video of himself to a prospective employer that was later posted online
and has diminished his employment prospects).
6. Expungement statutes provide a range of remedies that themselves typically do much less
than actually delete an individual’s criminal record. See 50 State Guide to Expungement Laws,
supra note 4 (noting that most states’ laws “reach only minor offenses or non-conviction records”
and that there is no federal expungement statute for federal convictions); see also infra notes 73–
106 and accompanying text (exemplifying the nature of expungement statutes).
7. For a discussion of what various states’ expungement statutes require regarding records, see
infra notes 73–106 and accompanying text (illustrating different expungement statutes that exist).
8. See Laura K. McKenzie, Note, The Right to Domain Silent: Rebalancing Tort Incentives to
Keep Pace with Information Availability for Criminal Suspects and Arrestees, 69 VAND. L. REV.
875, 876–79 (2016) (noting that an individual’s options for removing an online story about an arrest
or criminal investigation “range from inadequate to nonexistent”); see also Logan Danielle Wayne,
Comment, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal Legislation to Protect Post-Expungement
Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 258–60 (2012) (discussing the prevalence of data
brokers that collect criminal conviction records and are often not required to update their records
to reflect a later record expungement).
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private person—communicates an expunged criminal record? Does the
individual have a cause of action against the speaker for that
communication? Is it actually or “constructively”9 false in a way that
might support a cause of action for defamation or under the false light
tort?
This Article will describe the problems faced by individuals who are
harmed by the publication of criminal records that have been expunged,
and explore possible remedies available.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, the questions I address
can only be fully understood against the background of the crushing
mass-criminalization problem and the devastating impact of the collateral
consequences that flow from even a minor criminal record. As many
others have reported, a staggering number of individuals whose lives
have been derailed by criminal records have committed only minor, nonviolent crimes, often swept up in the vortex of the broken-windows
approach to policing.10 In a 2015 article, Jenny Roberts noted that over
the past four decades, approximately “one in three people in the United
States has some type of criminal record[,] . . . and the FBI adds between
10,000 and 12,000 new names to its database each day.” 11 At the time
she researched her article, Roberts reported that the FBI had 77.7 million
individuals in its database.12 The majority of these records are for minor
crimes. Roberts explains:
People are arrested . . . for things like littering, disorderly conduct,
possession of paraphernalia, driving with a license that has been
suspended for failure to pay parking tickets, trespassing, turnstile
jumping, or being drunk and causing people to stop and become
annoyed or harassed. Many others have criminal records for minor drug
possession.13
9. Black’s Law Dictionary defines constructive as:
That which is established by the mind of the law in its act of construing facts, conduct,
circumstances, or instruments, that which has not the character assigned to it in its own
essential nature, but acquires such character in consequence of the way in which it is
regarded by a rule or policy of law[.]
Constructive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) (citing Middleton v. Parke, 3 App. D.C.
149, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1894)).
10. Mass criminalization describes a different, even more pervasive problem than the more
well-known issue of mass incarceration. See Joel Rogers, Foreword: Federalism Bound, 10 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 294 (2016) (noting that “[b]etween a quarter and a third of adult Americans
have [criminal] records now, and each day the FBI adds another ten thousand new names to its
arrests database, which already contains records on eighty million individuals”); see also Roberts,
supra note 5, at 338 (citing statistics showing that 75 percent of all criminal court cases are
misdemeanor “quality of life” offenses).
11. Roberts, supra note 5, at 325–26.
12. Roberts, supra note 5, at 326.
13. Id. at 338; see also Laura Cohen, When the Law is Guilty: Confronting the Mass
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Most troubling, the impact of mass criminalization falls most heavily
on minority populations.14 A comprehensive analysis of solutions to the
phenomenon of mass criminalization lies beyond the scope of this Article
and the competence of this author. Others have taken on the issue with
intelligence and thoughtful suggestions for reform.15 But it is clear that
the pendulum of criminal justice reform swings back and forth. 16 We
appear to be in an era of increasing faith in mass criminalization and of
reliance on the prison-industrial complex as offering solutions to
perceived problems, especially in our cities, so vividly chronicled in Ava
DuVernay’s stunning film 13th.17 The real solution to the problems I
attempt to address here must lie in comprehensive criminal justice
reform. In the absence of that, I will analyze whether other remedies
might exist to provide some relief.
First, I will briefly summarize representative expungement statutes
which purport to erase the criminal record post facto. I conclude that even
the most robust expungement protocols do not protect individuals
because it is simply impossible to erase the record of an arrest, charge, or
conviction from all the places it might appear, especially in this datadriven information age. Indeed, sometimes expungement does more harm
than good by deluding the expungee into relying on the fact that the
record has been erased effectively, only to have it discovered by a
prospective employer, lender, or other third party who then concludes the
expungee is both an ex-con and a liar.
I then analyze whether it is possible to prevent access to criminal
records or control publication of such information in the first instance,
Incarceration Crisis in the United States, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 841, 843 (2014) (citing statistics
regarding incarceration for minor, non-violent offenses).
14. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (The New Press 2010) (asserting that the United States imprisons racial
and ethnic minorities at a rate far greater than any other country); see also Congressman John
Conyers, Jr., The Incarceration Explosion, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 377, 383 (2013) (“The mass
incarceration of African Americans . . . serves as a system of racial control similar to Jim Crow-era
laws”) (internal citation omitted); Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 967–68 (2013) (“From encounters with law enforcement
officers on our nation’s streets, roads and highways, to arrest, to charging decisions (including
youth charged as adults) to sentencing and to incarceration, poor African-Americans and Latinos
are disproportionately injected into the criminal justice system and remain stuck in it.”); 13TH
(Kandoo Films 2016).
15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 14; Conyers, supra note 14, at 383; 13TH, supra note 14;
Roberts, supra note 5, at 338; see also Cohen, supra note 13, at 843 (citing statistics regarding
incarceration for minor, non-violent offenses).
16. See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and
the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753, 765–79 (2011)
(detailing the uneven history of the restoration of rights and reputation after conviction in America).
17. 13TH, supra note 14.
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concluding that this is impossible because of important and appropriate
constitutional guarantees protecting the right to access and the right to
publish information concerning matters of public interest.18
If it is not possible to prevent access to and publication of criminal
records, can tort causes of action at least provide some remedy, and
perhaps caution restraint on those who would publish criminal records?
To answer this question, I examine potential tort claims, specifically,
defamation and false light. I conclude that tort law offers no real remedy.
In the context of a privacy claim, protection of the right to access and to
publish publicly available records foreclose a privacy action. In the
context of defamation and false light, such claims fail because the
claimant cannot prove the essential element—falsity—when the
information published is in fact true. In this regard, I discuss whether
claimants might invoke a notion of constructive falsity—that is, relying
on a fiction that would allow the process of expungement to miraculously
transform what was once in fact true (arrest, charge, conviction) to
“constructively false.” Again, the answer must be no. Important
constitutional limitations on imposing sanctions, even in the form of
damages, for publication of truthful speech, especially about a matter of
public interest, foreclose such claims. The Supreme Court’s robust
protection of speech laid out in New York Times v. Sullivan19 indicates
clearly that the Court would not tolerate such a fiction. And this is as it
should be.
Next I consider whether, in the context especially of online
publications (where the potential for harm is greatest because of the long
shelf-life and ready accessibility of such publications), statutory
provisions might require publishers to correct the record or to publish
addendums to reports of criminal records following expungement. Again,
Supreme Court precedent clearly indicates that such forced speech would
be found to violate the First Amendment.20

18. As noted below, criminal proceedings and criminal conduct have been found to be matters
of public interest for First Amendment purposes. See infra notes 124–159 and accompanying text
(citing to numerous cases that illustrate this point).
19. N.Y. Times Co. v. L. B. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that a public official
can recover for defamation only by proving by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant
acted with reckless disregard (actual malice) for the truth or falsity of the communication). The
Court noted that it viewed the case “against the background of a profound national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials.” Id. at 270 (internal citations omitted).
20. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 262 (1974) (holding that a state law
requiring a newspaper to provide print space to political candidates violated the First Amendment);
see also infra notes 272–281 and accompanying text (describing Tornillo in more detail).
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Against this background, I offer a modest suggestion: Publishers,
specifically online publishers, should voluntarily adopt policies under
which, in certain well-defined circumstances, they would publish
addendums to publications of criminal records, indicating that the record
has been officially expunged, and perhaps the circumstances justifying
the expungement.
I. THREE STORIES
“Reality continues to ruin my life.”21
For over a century, courts have wrestled with how to protect the idea
of a second act for individuals involved in the criminal justice system
while also protecting the law’s essential commitment to the marketplace
of ideas informed by free and robust expression of truthful information.
The early cases drew on Warren and Brandeis’s groundbreaking article,
“The Right to Privacy,” and Dean Prosser’s synthesis of four tort causes
of action sounding in privacy, specifically invoking the “disclosure of
private facts” cause of action. That approach did not work well. More
recently, individuals have turned to false light and defamation for
remedies. Is there a cause of action that can provide relief in these cases?
Is there even a real harm in need of a remedy, or are consequences—
intended and unintended, direct and indirect—simply a reality that those
with a criminal record try futilely to control?
To set the stage for our discussion, I begin with three stories of
individuals whose lives were ruined by publication of details of their
criminal pasts.
Gabrielle Darley Melvin: Tried and Acquitted—In 1918, Gabrielle
Darley shot Leonard Topp, her lover and pimp, after he abandoned her
for another woman. She was arrested and tried for murder. In her defense,
“she told a pitiful story of love, abandonment, and betrayal.”22 She was
acquitted.23 In 1919, she married Bernard Melvin and, at least as she told
it, turned away from her past to live an “exemplary, virtuous, honorable,
and righteous life” as Mrs. Melvin, caring for the family home and taking
her place in “respectable society” among many friends who knew nothing
of her previous life.24 In 1925, actress-turned-producer Dorothy
21. BILL WATTERSON, THE COMPLETE CALVIN AND HOBBES (Andrews McMeel Publishing
2005).
22. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY 216 (Stanford University Press 2007)
[hereinafter “LIFE’S DARK SECRETS”].
23. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931).
24. Id. Mrs. Melvin’s new life may not have been as respectable as she described it. There is
evidence she continued working as a prostitute and madam after marrying Mr. Melvin. See LIFE’S
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Davenport, or as she was known, Mrs. Wallace Reid,25 produced a movie
called The Red Kimono, which was part of a series of exposé films
focusing on serious social issues of the day. 26 The film told Gabriella
Darley Melvin’s story as a cautionary, socially conscious tale. It cast
Darley as an innocent young woman exploited by her lover—a smooth
talker who lured Darley from her abusive home with promises of love
and a better life. But instead, he forced her into a life of prostitution, only
to later abandon her in order to marry another woman, using Darley’s
money to buy the ring. A distraught Darley tracked Topp down in
California and shot him dead, leading to her trial for murder. Reid
described the film as being based on a true story, and used the now Mrs.
Melvin’s actual birth name, Gabriella Darley. Melvin reported that
because of the film, her friends and family learned of her difficult past,
were scandalized, and shunned her. Melvin’s new life as an upstanding
citizen was ruined.
Marvin Briscoe: Convicted and Rehabilitated—In 1956, Marvin
Briscoe and at least one accomplice “hijacked a truck in Danville,
Kentucky.”27 After some time on the run, and a gun battle with police,
Briscoe surrendered, eventually pleaded guilty to several crimes, and was
sentenced to prison.28 According to Briscoe, shortly after these events he
“abandoned his life of shame and became entirely rehabilitated
and . . . lived an exemplary, virtuous and honorable life . . . assum[ing] a
place in respectable society,” marrying, starting a family, and making
new friends, all of whom were “[un]aware of this incident [from] his
earlier life.”29 Just over a decade after the hijacking, Briscoe’s epiphany,
and his rehabilitation, Reader’s Digest published a five-page article

DARK SECRETS, supra note 22, at 218 (citing to how difficult it already was for Mrs. Melvin to
start all over again).
25. Ms. Davenport married her co-star, swashbuckling silent film lead Wallace Reid. It was
Reid’s death from morphine addiction that is believed to have inspired Dorothy Davenport to
launch the film series, which included an expose on the horrors of addiction. See John Sinnott, The
Red Kimona, DVD TALK (May 31, 2008), http://www.dvdtalk.com/reviews/33379/red-kimonathe/ (highlighting Ms. Davenport’s film career).
26. Id.
27. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (Cal. 1971), overruled by Gates v.
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004). The truck, which may have looked like it
was transporting valuable merchandise, was actually carrying four bowling pin spotters from
Yonkers, New York, worth little on any resale market available to Briscoe. Id.
28. JAMES HIGDON, THE CORNBREAD MAFIA 64–67 (Lyons Press 2013).
29. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36. From the opinion in Briscoe, one might conclude that the hijacking
was something of an unusual foray into crime by Briscoe—a bumbling misadventure. However,
Higdon describes Briscoe as a “young tough” who, along with his accomplice in the hijacking,
conducted a “reign of terror,” which included arson, beatings, and shootings. See HIGDON, supra
note 28, at 64 (describing this “reign of terror”).
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entitled “The Big Business of Hijacking” that focused on truck hijacking
as a crime phenomenon. The photo introducing the article included a
caption exclaiming: “Today’s highwaymen are looting trucks at a rate of
more than $100 million a year.”30 The article chronicled numerous
hijackings, including Briscoe’s, which it described as follows: “Typical
of many beginners, Marvin Briscoe and [another man] stole a ‘valuablelooking’ truck in Danville, Ky., and then fought a gun battle with the local
police. . . . ”31 The article did not specify the year that any of the crimes
it described took place (specifically, it did not mention that Briscoe’s
crime occurred in 1956), but did mention dates from 1965 through
publication of the article in 1968 in the text. Although he was referred to
only in that one sentence, after the article was published Briscoe reported
that his young daughter, who had not known about his past, learned of
her father’s criminal history, and that friends and family now shunned
him because of what was revealed in the article.
Lorraine Martin: Arrested but not Prosecuted—Lorraine Martin and
her two sons were arrested on August 20, 2010. Police searched their
home on suspicion that the family was involved in a drug ring. The search
of their home yielded “marijuana, scales, plastic bags, and drug
paraphernalia.”32 Local news sources, including Hearst Publishing
outlets, covered the arrest. On August 26, 2010, one of the Hearst
company’s online newspapers reported that the police “arrested [Martin]
and charged [her] with numerous drug violations . . . after police received
information that a pair of brothers were [sic] selling marijuana in town.”33
On August 27, 2010, a Hearst broadcast outlet published an online article
reporting that Martin was “arrested on Aug. 20 after police say they
confiscated 12 grams of marijuana, scales and traces of cocaine from
[her] house.”34 The articles were truthful and remained online.35 Just over
a year later, the state decided not to prosecute Martin and entered a nolle
prosequi,36 an action that essentially suspends the proceeding without
any final determination, but that permits the possibility of reinstating the
charges within the applicable statute of limitations. 37 In Martin’s case,
30. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36.
31. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015).
33. Id. at 549.
34. Id.
35. See id. (“Martin concedes that [the] reports were accurate at the time they were published.”).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 420 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cislo v. City of
Shelton, 692 A.2d 1255, 1260 n.9 (Conn. 1997)) (“[Under Connecticut law,] [a] nolle prosequi is
a ‘unilateral act by a prosecutor, which ends the pending proceedings without an acquittal and
without placing the defendant in jeopardy.’”).
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charges were not reinstated, and, pursuant to Connecticut’s Erasure Law,
the record of her arrest was—well—erased. The Connecticut erasure
statute specifies that when charges “ha[ve] been nolled . . . [and] at least
thirteen months have elapsed since [the] nolle, all police and court records
and records of the state’s or prosecuting attorney . . . pertaining to such
charge shall be erased. . . . ”38 Despite its name, erasure under the statute
does not involve destruction of the record; rather, the record is sealed and
kept from disclosure.39 The statute also specifies that the erasure shall
occur by operation of law and that “the clerk or the person charged with
the retention and control of such records shall not disclose to anyone their
existence or any information pertaining to any charge so erased. . . . ”40
That “seal” has power; once a record is erased and sealed, the subject of
the record is deemed not to have been arrested ab initio.41 Further, this
person “legally could state that he or she had not been arrested with
respect to the relevant charges[,]”42 and the statute states that he or she
could swear to that under oath.43
Relying on the Erasure Statute, Martin asked the media outlets to
remove the earlier stories reporting her arrest. They refused, and she sued,
alleging claims for libel, false light, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and appropriation.44
Consider the cases together: In Briscoe, an accurate report of an arrest
and guilty plea gave rise to a privacy cause of action. In Melvin, an
accurate report of life facts and an acquittal gave rise to a privacy cause
of action. However, the outcomes of both these cases were later called
into question by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions beginning with
Cox Broadcasting, which held that truthful reports of facts relating to
criminal matters of public interest are protected by the First
Amendment.45 Indeed, the California Supreme Court, responding to these
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c)(1) (2017). The statute also provides for erasure when an
accused is found not guilty or the charges have been dismissed. Id. § 54-142a(a).
39. See Skall, supra note 4, at 350 n.67 (“‘Erasure,’ as used in the [Connecticut] statute, does
not refer to the physical destruction of records, but rather to the act of sealing the records and
keeping them from public view.”).
40. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c)(1) (2017).
41. See id. § 54-142a(e)(3). The statute provides that the subject may “swear under oath” as to
the erasure. Id.
42. Cislo v. City of Shelton, 692 A.2d 1255, 1261 (Conn. 1997).
43. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(e)(3) (2017); see also Cislo, 692 A.2d at 1261 (noting the
history of amendments to § 54-142a(c) since its enactment in 1963).
44. See Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40
(2015) (describing Martin’s argument that even though she was arrested, once erasure occurred, it
became false to publish statements about her arrest). Martin also sued for negligent infliction of
emotional distress and invasion of privacy all based on the reports. See id.
45. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 470 (1975) (holding that protection of freedom
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holdings, overturned Briscoe explicitly in Gateway v. Discovery
Communications,46 and many commentators question the continued
viability of the public disclosure tort, particularly in cases involving
criminal proceedings or other matters falling into the broad sweep of
matters of public interest.47 In Martin, the plaintiff, no doubt informed by
the Cox line of cases, hinged her claims on falsity. Although not pleaded
as such, Martin must have contemplated constructive falsity, created by
the Erasure Statute’s retroactive rewriting and sealing of the record of
Martin’s actual arrest, and effective nullification of that arrest.
Nonetheless, Martin’s case was dismissed.48 The Second Circuit found
that the information in the articles was in fact true, and that they
accurately reported the facts, despite the operation of the Erasure Statute,
and so “her various publication-related tort claims necessarily fail[ed].”49
Was the California court right in its first take on Briscoe and Melvin?
As the court in Melvin stated, and the court in Briscoe repeated, “[o]ne of
the major objectives of society . . . and of the administration of our penal
system, is the rehabilitation of the fallen and the reformation of the
criminal.”50 In Briscoe, the court did consider the public interest
argument; it anticipated and responded to what the U.S. Supreme Court
would later say, recognizing that “[t]he public has a strong interest in
enforcing the law, and this interest is served by accumulating and
disseminating data cataloguing the reasons men commit crimes, the
methods they use, and the ways in which they are apprehended.”51 But in

of press provided by First Amendment bars state from sanctioning truthful publication of rape
victim’s name when information is legally obtained); see also Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443
U.S. 97, 97 (1979) (holding statute prohibiting publication of truthful, lawfully obtained
information identifying alleged juvenile offender violated First Amendment); Landmark
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 829 (1978) (finding criminal punishment of news media
for publishing truthful, lawfully obtained information regarding confidential proceedings of
Judicial Inquiry violated First Amendment); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court in & for Okla. Cty.,
430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977) (holding truthful publication of name of minor involved in criminal
proceeding, legally obtained, was protected by First Amendment). For a fuller discussion of the
Cox line of cases, see infra notes 141–156 and accompanying text (illustrating that the U.S.
Supreme Court found this issue pressing).
46. Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 559 (Cal. 2004).
47. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for A Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 337 (1983) (stating common law private-facts
tort has failed to become usable and effective means of redress for plaintiffs and is “both
constitutionally and practically untenable”).
48. Martin, 777 F.3d at 546.
49. Id. at 552.
50. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971) (quoting Melvin v. Reid, 297
P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931), overruled by Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552
(Cal. 2004)).
51. Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 40.
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balancing the competing interests, the state court analyzed whether
disclosing the detail of the individual’s name and connecting his criminal
past with his rehabilitated present was important.52 It concluded it was
not, and that interest in this particular detail of truthful information
amounted to mere curiosity which did not outweigh society’s interest in
rehabilitation.53 “[S]ociety should permit him to continue in the path of
rectitude rather than throw him back into a life of shame or crime.”54
In Briscoe and Melvin, the aggrieved individuals sought their remedies
in privacy actions, arguing that the passage of time and their rehabilitation
transformed what may have been a matter of public interest into a private
matter.55 Martin, on the other hand, argued that the operation of the
Erasure Statute actually transformed the facts, or erased them.56
Expungement or erasure statutes such as the one at issue in Martin foster
the policy interests the courts in Briscoe and Melvin sought to protect.
They are designed to minimize the collateral damage of arrest and
conviction and to facilitate reentry into society, thus reducing the risk of
recidivism.57 Should these policies trump the public’s interest in the
details of crimes? The Connecticut legislature gave the statute at issue in
Martin teeth, as noted above, by providing that Martin could deny her
criminal record.58 If Martin could swear under oath that she was never
arrested, how could a news outlet’s report that she was arrested be
protected as truthful speech? Yet, how could it not, without descending
into Orwellian Doublethink?59 In his thoughtful opinion in Martin, Judge
Wesley drew on the Rubáiyát, observing: “The Moving Finger has

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 41.
55. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931); Briscoe, 483 P.2d at 36.
56. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015).
57. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 327 (“Collateral consequences are the purportedly nonpunitive,
noncriminal consequences that can flow automatically or as a matter of discretion from a criminal
conviction. These consequences affect a person’s employment and housing prospects, parental
rights, educational opportunities, freedom of movement, and just about every other aspect of daily
life.”); see also Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Note, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal
Expungement Law in Minnesota–State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1332 (2005)
(“A publicly available criminal record is devastating to an individual’s hope of re-integrating into
society. . . . ”).
58. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text (discussing Connecticut’s Erasure Law,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (2017)).
59. ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213–14. As noted above, in Orwell’s 1984, the party could just
rewrite history, and once rewritten, the old version disappeared—never was: “[T]hough the past is
alterable, it never has been altered in any specific instance. For when it has been re-created in
whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different past can
ever have existed.” ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213.
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written and moved on.”60 The poet added that “nor thy [p]iety nor [w]it
[s]hall lure it back to cancel half a [l]ine, [n]or all thy [t]ears wash out a
[w]ord of it.”61 But an expungement or erasure statute can—or can it?
This Article uses these cases, focusing primarily on the Martin case,
as a backdrop for consideration of how to balance the interests of the
individual and society in rehabilitation and policies that support a “second
chapter” in people’s lives, with the competing interest in preserving free,
informed, and robust debate, and the constitutional protections for
truthful speech, addressing primarily whether a truthful report of an arrest
or conviction, once expunged,62 should give rise to falsity-based claims
sounding in defamation or false light.
II. EXPUNGEMENT: INTO THE MEMORY HOLE63
“Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.”64
Expungement as a concept gained footing as a result of mid-twentieth
century criminal law reform movements that focused on rehabilitative
justice and the notion of a redeemed former offender. Such reform began
in the 1940s in specialized sentencing regimes designed for juveniles,
both because they were more likely to be rehabilitated, and because it
seemed unfair to burden the youthful offender with a record for a lifetime
given what was understood even then about the realities of brain
development in adolescents.65 Eventually, in what one commentator
described as “the optimistic temper of the times,” the idea of wiping the
slate clean, both to encourage and to reward real rehabilitation, was
extended to adult offenders as well.66 Although the optimistic
60. Martin, 777 F.3d at 552 n.7 (citing Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyam, stanza 71 (Edward
Fitzgerald trans., 4th ed. 1879)).
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 49–91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various expungement
options. Jurisdictions apply a variety of names and remedies to the processes available to cleanse a
criminal record. For convenience, I will usually rely on expungement and expunge to capture the
various models.
63. [T]hey were nicknamed memory holes. When one knew that any document was due for
destruction . . . it was an automatic action to lift the flap of the nearest memory hole and drop
it in, whereupon it would be whirled away on a current of warm air . . . to the enormous
furnaces which were hidden somewhere in the recesses of the building.
ORWELL, supra note 2, at 37–38.
64. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK 53 (1914).
65. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1709–10 (2003) [hereinafter
“Starting Over”] (describing the early idea that children’s “antisocial conduct was . . . temporary”);
see also A. Rae Simpson, Young Adult Development Project, MIT WORK-LIFE CENTER,
http://hrweb.mit.edu/worklife/youngadult/brain.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (“[T]he human
brain does not reach full maturity until at least the mid-20s.”).
66. Starting Over, supra note 65, at 1710–11.
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rehabilitative tenor of the 1950s and 1960s soon gave way to a more
retributive approach to criminal justice,67 most jurisdictions (except the
federal government) have adopted some mechanism for sealing,
expunging, or erasing records.68
A. State Expungement Laws
What these provisions are called, and the exact details of how they
function in terms of who may seek relief, how the individual seeks relief,
and what precise relief is granted, differ widely from state to state. 69 For
our purposes, the nature of the relief granted is the most important issue.
Quite appropriately, most jurisdictions provide different expungement
relief depending on the nature of the circumstances and the characteristics
of the individual. Consistent with the history of expungement
jurisprudence, juvenile offenders are given more generous relief, as are
individuals who are charged and acquitted or individuals who are charged
or arrested, but who are not ultimately prosecuted. Those convicted of
felonies are typically given the least in terms of expungement remedies.
Misdemeanors generally fall in the middle.70 But again, our focus here is
on the remedy itself and what it means, regardless of whether it is the
right result given the seriousness of the crime, or the age or status of the
offender. Therefore, I will begin by looking at representative statutory
provisions and examining how expungement is implemented as the
necessary background for understanding how expunged information
remains available, and how subsequent reports of expunged information
should be handled, but without focusing unnecessarily on the status of the

67. Starting Over, supra note 65, at 1714–15.
68. See Amy Shlosberg et al., Expungement and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 353, 355–57 (2014) (explaining how forty-five states and Washington, D.C., have
some process to expunge criminal records, while the federal government does not allow
expungement for most offenses); see also 50 State Guide to Expungement Laws, supra note 4
(comparing the methods that the states take in expunging a criminal record).
69. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 323 (“There is no one definition of sealing or expungement.
These terms have a variety of definitions under different state laws, which can range from actual
destruction of a record to leaving the record open to the public but marking it ‘expunged.’”); see
also David A. Weintraub, When Does “No” Mean “Yes”? With Expungements, of Course, 88 APR
N.Y. ST. B.J. 47, 48–49 (2016) (surveying various states’ expungement statutes); 50 State Guide to
Expungement Laws, supra note 4 (discussing how expungement “may involve destruction of
records . . . limited restriction on public access . . . [or] no limit of public access at all—although
some records may be sealed”).
70. See 50 State Guide to Expungement Laws, supra note 4 (describing how most of the new
state expungement laws cover minor offenses); see also 50-State Comparison Judicial
Expungement, Sealing, Set-aside, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RESOURCE CENTER (last updated
June
2017),
http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-2/restoration-of-rights/50-statecomparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/ [hereinafter “50 State Guide Comparison
Chart”] (comparing the various state expungement laws).
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individual, the procedural posture of the charges, or the seriousness of the
crime. Others have chronicled this.71
Some jurisdictions actually destroy the records, and say so clearly. For
example, the standard expungement order in Pennsylvania, which
permits expungement under fairly limited circumstances, requires the
“[Commonwealth to] expunge and destroy the official and unofficial
arrest, expungement and other documents pertaining to the arrest or
prosecution[.]”72 Alabama permits an individual to petition the court to
order a juvenile record destroyed five years after the individual attains
majority,73 and allows the court to “expunge nonconviction records of
nonviolent felonies and misdemeanors, including [specifically] cases
where the charges were dismissed[,]” requiring all agencies with these
records to eliminate and remove them within thirty days.74 South
Carolina’s statute provides (with some minor exceptions) that when a
charge has been dismissed or the accused found not guilty, “all records
must be destroyed and ‘no evidence of the record . . . [may] be retained
by any municipal, county, or State law enforcement agency.’” 75 Illinois
uses the word expunged and then explicitly defines the term to mean that
records held by criminal agencies must be destroyed and any listing or
index including the individual’s name must also be destroyed. 76 The
Illinois legislature deals more gingerly with court records providing that
when a record is expunged, the court records must be impounded, and
under certain circumstances, the name of the individual “obliterated on
the official index,” and court personnel must respond to inquiries about
these records “as it does in response to inquiries when no records ever
71. To be sure, the trend in expungement laws is to give the greatest relief to juvenile offenders
who have subsequent clean records, and to those wrongfully charged. See, e.g., 50 State Guide
Comparison Chart, supra note 70 (showing various state expungement laws for juvenile offenders);
see also Roberts, supra note 5 (discussing the scope of state expungement laws); see generally
Wallace Wade, Who’s Lying Now?: How the Public Dissemination of Incomplete, Thus HalfTruthful, Criminal Record Information Regarding a Statutorily Rehabilitated Petty Offender is an
Unjust Penalty and Why Laws Regarding Expungement of and Restrictions on Dissemination of
Criminal Records Information in California Must Be Reformed, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2010)
(noting the ineffectiveness of California’s statutes on expunging juveniles’ records).
72. Doe v. Zappala, 987 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
73. See ALA. CODE §§ 12-15-136, 12-15-137 (2016). The court enters a destruction order,
which requires that “all references including arrest, complaints, referrals, petitions, reports, and
orders shall be removed from all department or agency official and institutional files and
destroyed.” Id. § 12-15-137(b).
74. 50 State Guide Comparison Chart, supra note 70 (citing ALA. CODE §§ 15-27-1-2, 41-9625 (2016)). “Eliminate and remove” would seem to contemplate destruction of the records.
75. 50 State Guide Comparison Chart, supra note 70 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-1-40 (2016)).
76. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 2630/5.2(a)(1)(E) (2017) (“‘Expunge’ means to physically destroy
the records or return them to the petitioner and to obliterate the petitioner’s name from any official
index or public record, or both.”).

16

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 49

existed.”77
While some jurisdictions in some instances call for the actual
destruction or obliteration of records that have been expunged, more
frequently the provisions call for sealing or limiting access to the records.
Exactly what this means again differs from state to state. For example,
the Louisiana code provides: “‘Expunge a record’ means to remove a
record of arrest or conviction, photographs, fingerprints, disposition, or
any other information of any kind from public access.”78 But the statute
is clear that remove does not mean destroy: “‘Expunge a record’ does not
mean destruction of the record.”79
Indiana provides that for certain misdemeanors, when the court grants
expungement, it must order the involved law enforcement agencies to
“prohibit the release of the person’s records or information in the person’s
records to anyone without a court order, other than a law enforcement
officer acting in the course of the officer’s official duty[,]” and must
“[o]rder the central repository for criminal history information
maintained by the state police department to seal the person’s expunged
conviction records.”80 Records sealed under this subdivision may be
disclosed only to limited officials (including prosecutors, the FBI,
defense attorneys, mortgage investigators, and interestingly, the Supreme
Court and bar examiners in the context of bar admissions).81 Further, in
a quite remarkable provision, the statute requires that when the name of
an individual granted expungement is included in an opinion or
memorandum decision, the court must take the following steps:
(1) redact the opinion or memorandum decision as it appears on the
computer gateway administered by the office of technology so it
does not include the petitioner’s name (in the same manner that
opinions involving juveniles are redacted); and
(2) provide a redacted copy of the opinion to any publisher or
organization to whom the opinion or memorandum decision is

77. Id. § 2630/5.2(d)(9)(A)(iii).
78. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 972(1) (2017).
79. Id.
80. IND. CODE § 35-38-9-6(a)(1)–(2) (2016).
81. Id. § 35-38-9-6(a)(2). The issue of how bar applicants and bar examiners should respond
under various expungement protocols, especially those that specify the individual may deny under
oath the expunged record, raises serious concerns for applicants, law schools, and bar officials. See,
e.g., Mitchell M. Simon, Limiting the Use of Expunged Offenses in Bar and Law School Admission
Processes: A Case for Not Creating Unnecessary Problems, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 79 (2014) (discussing the impact of expunged offenses in the law school and bar admission
processes); see generally Lydia Johnson, The Illusion of a Second Chance: Expunctions Versus the
Law School and State Bar Application Processes, 9 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 183 (2013) (discussing
the problems with the disclosure questions on law school applications).
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provided after the date of the order of expungement.82
The Indiana statute does specifically state that the court is not required
to destroy these opinions, just redact the expunged individual’s name in
its records. But the fact that the statute contemplates sending the redacted
opinion to various “publishers” appears to contemplate that Lexis,
Westlaw, et al., are expected to take some action. Would they? Must
they?83 Indiana’s acknowledgement of the problem, and the legislature’s
efforts to manage information after it has been disseminated, informs our
discussion as yet another effort to rewrite the record.
Maryland provides for expungement of some records and shielding of
others. According to the Maryland statute, expungement requires the
information to be removed from public inspection, which can be by either
“obliteration” or “removal to a separate secure area to which persons who
do not have legitimate reason for access are denied access.”84 Under
“Disposition of Expunged Records,” the Maryland Court Rules specify
that expunged court files “shall be removed from their usual and
customary filing or storage location.”85 Files must be placed in a “manila
envelope” that carries the docket number, as well as the Clerk’s
Certificate of Expungement and Caution, which reads in relevant part:
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this sealed envelope contains the case file
relating [to the docket matter] . . . which records have been
expunged . . . CAUTION: This envelope is not to be unsealed or the
contents or any part thereof disclosed to any person except pursuant to
a written Order of the Court, under penalty of a fine of up to $1,000,
imprisonment for up to one year . . . and to dismissal from
employment.86

82. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-6(c) (2016).
83. Online catalogues of court proceedings, coupled with the evolution of fast and efficient
search engines that can locate this material using just a name, have created a nasty privacy problem
for individuals who must expose often highly intimate, sometimes embarrassing details to a court
for any variety of reasons (for example, actions for benefits or insurance coverage; family disputes;
competency proceedings; etc.). A mess to be sure, but one that is beyond the scope of this Article
and addressed by a good number of excellent scholarly articles. See, e.g., Amanda Conley et. al.,
Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A
Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772 (2012) (addressing the problems that are created
with easily accessible online court records); Symposium, Panel One: General Discussion on
Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2011) (discussing the concern
of disclosing private information with the increase of public accessibility to court files); Peter A.
Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of
Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004) (arguing that the traditional balance of
disclosure of judicial records and the need to limit disclosure is upset when judicial records are
available online).
84. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-101(e) (West 2016).
85. MD. RULE 4-512.
86. Id.
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The Clerk is required to keep an alphabetical listing of expunged records,
but that list is to be kept in a locked cabinet in a secure area with no public
access.87
On the other hand, shielding under the Maryland statute “means to
render a court record and police record relating to a conviction
inaccessible by members of the public.”88 A shielded record is accessible
to specific individuals, including law enforcement and certain employers
and licensing agencies that are required by law to do criminal background
checks,89 but those individuals are prohibited from disclosing the
shielded information to anyone other than those specifically identified by
the statute.90 In addition, the Maryland statute specifies that Maryland’s
criminal records search engine must not “in any way refer to the existence
of specific records shielded” under the statute.91 Shielding applies to
fewer (typically less serious) offenses and is easier to accomplish (it does
not require a court hearing), while expungement applies to more serious
matters and is harder to accomplish, but may provide stronger
protections.
Some states call for correction of the record, but not full
expungement.92 For example, Arizona provides that a person
“wrongfully arrested” may petition the court to require an entry on the
person’s court and criminal records “that the person has been cleared.”93
The statute also limits access: “The order shall further require that all law
enforcement agencies and courts shall not release copies of or provide
access to such records to any person except on order of the court.”94
Ironically, this might actually undercut the effectiveness of the
correction.
Of particular interest for our purposes, several states permit the
individual to deny that the record ever existed, and sometimes that the
facts memorialized in it ever happened, through expungement or sealing.
For example, as noted above, Connecticut’s Erasure Statute, which was
in play in the Martin case, specifies that for matters where charges were
never prosecuted, or where the accused was acquitted, erasure means that

87. Id.
88. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-301(e) (West 2016).
89. Id. § 10-302(b)(2).
90. Id. § 10-306(a).
91. Id. § 10-304.
92. See, e.g., State v. Mohajerin, 244 P.3d 107, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing how
Arizona’s statute allows for “notation of clearance” but does not authorize expungement or that law
enforcement be denied access).
93. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4051(A) (LexisNexis 2016).
94. Id. § 13-4051(B).
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the arrest is deemed never to have happened, and the individual “may so
swear under oath.”95 Delaware provides that when a record of a juvenile
offense is expunged, the offense “does not have to be disclosed as an
arrest by the petitioner for any reason.”96 Similarly, Ohio provides that
when a juvenile record is expunged, “the person who is the subject of the
expunged records properly may, and the court shall, reply that no record
exists with respect to the person upon any inquiry in the matter.”97
Washington’s sentencing reform act provides for a broad range of
offenders who satisfactorily complete their sentence to have them
vacated.98 Once the sentence is vacated, the statute specifies that “[f]or
all purposes . . . an offender whose conviction has been vacated may state
that the offender has never been convicted of that crime.”99
On a related note, many of these statutes also stipulate that the effect
of an expungement is to decree by operation of law that the event did not
occur. There is some slippage among jurisdictions regarding whether this
applies to the legal proceeding (the arrest that did not result in a charge
or a charge that did not result in a conviction), or the underlying facts (the
real-world events that gave rise to the legal proceeding). Connecticut’s
statute, for example, provides that when a charge is not prosecuted, it is
expunged and that the person “shall be deemed to have never been
arrested,”100 while Illinois (in a statute addressing juvenile convictions)
specifies that once an expungement order is entered, “the
offense . . . shall be treated as if it never occurred.”101
B. Expungement—A Cruel Illusion?
As this sampling demonstrates, states offer a range of protections for
expunged, sealed, or erased records. But, as noted above, even under the
most protective regimes, the idea of expungement may be a cruel
“illusion.”102 The record may remain in public repositories by virtue of
95. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40 (2015);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(e)(3) (West 2016).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1019(c) (2017).
97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.358(F) (West 2017).
98. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.640(2) (West 2016) (laying out the guidelines
pertaining to what constitutes a satisfactory completion of a sentence).
99. Id. § 9.94A.640(3).
100. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(e)(3) (West 2016).
101. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-915(2.6)(i) (2016).
102. See Wade, supra note 71, at 14–15 (explaining the differences between the legal and
dictionary definitions of the term “expungement” as analogous to complete erasure, in contrast to
California Penal Code § 1203’s express language stating that expungement does not relieve a party
from the “obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question contained in any
questionnaire or application for public office”); see also Roberts, supra note 5, at 323 (explaining
that expungement has varied definitions across jurisdictions); see also Wayne, supra note 8, at 257
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delay or mistakes in effectuation of the order. Or, it may remain in some
index or listing, or as the shadow of a record not completely erased
everywhere. But even more important, the information subject to
expungement, erasure, or sealing was once public, and so was likely
disseminated. Therefore, it lurks in a variety of places not subject to the
constraints of expungement laws, including media reports, the files of
data brokers, scholarly journals, or as Wallace Wade observed, even in
“a compulsive newspaper-clipper’s attic.”103 He illustrated his point by
drawing on the medieval penance for gossipers: they were required to cut
open a pillow and release the feathers from the rooftop, and then try to
retrieve them—the effort to recapture all the feathers providing vivid
imagery of the futility of recapturing the gossip, or in our case, the
information, once let fly.104
Often the expungement statutes attempt to address this issue.
California’s statute makes an effort to recapture the information from
some sources, requiring that consumer reporting agencies “no
longer . . . [report]” criminal records if the individual was pardoned or an
arrest resulted in nolle pros or an acquittal.105 Similarly, Connecticut’s
statute requires data collection agencies that acquire and report criminal
records to “permanently delete such erased records” and adds that these
entities “shall not further disclose such erased records.”106 And, as noted
above, Indiana requires that the court redact the names of individuals who
have been granted expungement from various opinions and memoranda
and to send these redacted opinions to publishers, presumably with the
hope that they, too, will redact the names.107 Several federal statutes seek
to achieve the same results, but only in narrow contexts, such as
restricting the use of criminal records in credit reporting under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.108 How effective such requirements are in getting

(discussing how expungements do not provide complete legal relief).
103. See Wade, supra note 71, at 10, 30, 35 (noting that California Government Code § 6253.5
allows disclosure of “whereabouts and victims of crime” for use in “scholarly, journalistic, political,
or governmental purpose,” addressing the existence of issues regarding limits on private
investigators’ and credit reporters’ use of such information, and noting that it is nearly impossible
to completely erase all record of an arrest because evidence can remain in a variety of places outside
the usual government databases such as a newspaper archive); see also Wayne, supra note 8, at 255
(discussing how “expungement orders do not apply to non-government sources . . . at great cost to
individuals with expunged records”).
104. Wade, supra note 71, at 23 n.143.
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a)(7) (West 2010).
106. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142e(b) (West 2016).
107. See MD. RULE 4-512 (outlining the process of recording expunged records in Maryland);
see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-101(d)–(e) (West 2016) (which specifically defines
the procedures described in MD. RULE 4-512).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (2012) (prohibiting credit reporting agencies’ use of arrest
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actual compliance from the entities directed to delete the records remains
to be seen. Further, such piecemeal efforts that address only certain
sources leave many other places where the information will remain. To
replace the “feathers” metaphor with one my father used for futile tasks,
it is like sweeping the sun off the roof.
C. An Alternative: Forgive, Not Forget (And Say So Out Loud)
Some who advocate for reform designed to lessen the collateral impact
of conviction are moving away from the remedies of expungement and
erasure and toward a system that acknowledges the past but admits (or
exclaims) rehabilitation. As Judge Gleeson, who issued what has been
identified as the first federal Certificate of Rehabilitation,109 observed,
there are two general approaches to limiting the collateral consequences
of convictions: (1) the “forgetting” model, in which a criminal record is
deleted or expunged so that society may forget that the conviction ever
happened; and (2) the “forgiveness” model, which acknowledges the
conviction but uses a certificate of rehabilitation or a pardon to symbolize
society’s forgiveness of the underlying offense conduct.110
Judge Gleeson noted that momentum for the forgiveness argument has
been increasing—and that argument convinced him to take the
extraordinary step of issuing his self-styled Certificate of
Rehabilitation.111 Relevant to our inquiry, Judge Gleeson explained that
employers (and in the broader range of instances, those who do research
on an individual’s history for whatever reason) do not have the time to

records that precede issuance of credit reports by more than seven years).
109. See Jesse Wegman, A Federal Judge’s New Model for Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/opinion/a-federal-judges-new-model-forforgiveness.html?_r=0 (explaining that Judge Gleeson designed a “federal certificate of
rehabilitation” to obviate employment struggles faced by a woman who had served the entirety of
her prison sentence for staging a false car accident to gain insurance benefits). While the federal
system does not statutorily provide such relief, many states do. According to one media report,
fourteen states have adopted some form of certificate of rehabilitation; see Eli Hager, Forgiving vs.
Forgetting,
THE
MARSHALL
PROJECT
(Mar.
17,
2015,
5:53PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/03/17/forgiving-vs-forgetting#.6wOWmwn5D
(explaining Barack Obama’s 2003 Illinois State Senate bill that would provide those who had been
arrested, or completed an incarceration or probation, a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities
showing employers that they were rehabilitated and would no longer be judged for their crimes).
110. Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing David J. Norman,
Note, Stymied by the Stigma of a Criminal Conviction: Connecticut and the Struggle to Relieve
Collateral Consequences, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 985, 1006 (2013)).
111. See id. at 442, 445–46 (noting that there are both practical and philosophical reasons for
the forgiveness model’s gained traction, and several states had already adopted similar remedies).
Judge Gleeson patterned both his inquiry and his certificate on similar state remedies. Id. at 444–
45; see id. at 447 to view the actual certificate Judge Gleeson used.
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scour the entire record of a former offender.112 Therefore, he undertook
the analysis for them. He reviewed “each page of Doe’s trial transcript,
presentence report, probation reports, deposition transcript, and other
documents she and the government provided . . . or a holistic view of her
character and competency today,” and concluded “that there [was] no
relationship between Doe’s conviction and her fitness to be a nurse.”113
As Judge Gleeson recognized, it is unlikely that those who rely upon or
disseminate criminal records will have the resources (or the inclination)
to undertake such a thorough analysis.114 Rather, the record typically will
stand on its face and yield judgments about its meaning, usually
damaging to the individual.115
Exacerbating the problem, Frank Pasquale describes the impulse to
instantly share information as an “accelerationist ethic” and notes the
push to what is described in the information world as “frictionless
sharing.”116 To illustrate, he quotes Gawker’s CEO as saying:
Whatever information we have, whatever insight we have, whatever
knowledge we have, our impulse is to share it as quickly as possible,
and sometimes with as little thought as possible. . . . Before you can
think about it too much, just put it out there, just share it out there.117

Even more chilling, Pasquale describes extortion sites that capitalize
on this “frictionless sharing” by trolling for mug shots and records,
posting them, and then demanding money from the individuals depicted
in exchange for taking down the pictures and records.118
In light of this, the forgiveness argument is persuasive for a number of
reasons, both principled and pragmatic.119 For our purposes, the
pragmatic arguments are most significant, particularly considering the
112. Id. at 441–42.
113. Id. at 442.
114. Id. at 441–42.
115. See, e.g., Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1328 (2017)
(explaining that past offenders are permanently reduced to “second-class status,” regardless of
whether they have completed their required sentence); Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating
Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Approach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 405 (2015) (addressing
the general public discrimination faced by those with criminal histories).
116. Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 520 (2015).
117. Id. at 519–20 (quoting Jonathan Mahler, Gawker’s Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/business/media/gawker-nick-denton-moment-oftruth.html).
118. Id. at 536–37.
119. See Love, supra note 16, at 759 (discussing the history of the restoration of rights and
reputation after conviction in America). For a comprehensive argument to replace blame with
forgiveness as the guiding principle of the criminal justice system, see Nichola Lacey & Hanna
Pickard, To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice,
35 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 665, 669–88 (2015) (advancing “responsibility without blame,”
evolutionary, instrumental and ethical arguments for the forgiveness model).
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futility of efforts to force “forgetting” in an age of modern technology
and in light of First Amendment constraints. But is it possible to force
real forgiveness? Even assuming a good-faith effort, knowing about a
criminal record yet not having it influence one’s thinking and judgments
sounds like Dostoevsky’s polar bear task: “Try . . . not to think of a polar
bear, and you will see that the cursed thing will come to mind every
minute.”120 Against this background, we will use Ms. Martin’s case as a
hypothetical to explore possible solutions.
III. PREVENTING THE HARM BEFORE IT HAPPENS
“If people are constantly falling off a cliff, you could place ambulances
under the cliff, or build a fence at the top of the cliff.”121
Given the difficulty of recapturing, correcting, or erasing criminal
records, why not simply make them unavailable to the public, including
the media in the first place, or at least prohibit publication of these
records? The answer, of course, is that there are constitutional restraints
on such strategies. Public access to judicial proceedings boasts a long
history in Anglo-American jurisprudence.122 In the United States, this
commitment to open access finds its inspiration in a Meiklejohnian
philosophy of an informed electorate as essential to a functioning
democracy.123
A. Restricting Access to Trials and Criminal Proceedings
A line of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, established a constitutional “presumption of openness” for
criminal trials, later extending this presumption to other steps involved in
120. Lea Winerman, Suppressing the “White Bears,” 42 MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY 44, 44
(Oct. 2011) http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/10/unwanted-thoughts.aspx (citing FYODOR
DOSTOEVSKY, WINTER NOTES ON SUMMER IMPRESSIONS 49 (David Patterson Trans. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that research by psychologist Daniel Wegner confirms
Dostoevsky’s impressions)).
121. John McDougall, Denis Burkitt, MD Opened McDougall’s Eyes to Diet and Disease, THE
MCDOUGALL
NEWSLETTER
(Jan.
2013),
https://www.drmcdougall.com/misc/2013nl/jan/burkitt.pdf (quoting Dr. Denis Burkitt).
122. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556–57 (1980)
(finding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments require allowance for press and public to attend
criminal trials).
123. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant:
Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 945–46 (2009)
[hereinafter “Privacy and Access to Court Records”] (explaining Alexander Meiklejohn’s strong
push in 1979 for a right of public admittance to trials as a First Amendment issue, the resolution of
which was “intimately linked to the processes of republican self-government”); see also Richmond
Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 575–76 (“[T]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of
information from which members of the public may draw.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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criminal proceedings.124 To be clear, this recognition of a presumption of
access is not absolute, but rather a qualified right—a point the Court
makes in each of the cases.125 Under modern application of the Richmond
rule, the question of access is determined by applying a balancing
analysis. The court must ask: “(1) whether the proceeding traditionally
has been open to the public; and (2) whether public access would play a
‘significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.’”126 If the answer to these two questions is yes, the court must
meet what amounts to a strict scrutiny standard to close the proceeding.
The court must make “specific, on the record findings . . . demonstrating
that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.’”127 Applying this standard, “the courts of appeals
have found a First Amendment right of access to [a range of proceedings:]
bail hearings, suppression hearings, guilty pleas, and sentencing
hearings.”128 Thus, closing the proceeding will rarely meet constitutional
muster.
B. Restricting Access to Court Records
The logic of the open courtroom cases drives a similar outcome in
cases involving access to records of criminal proceedings, although the
Supreme Court has never squarely held that this right is constitutionally
protected. Rather, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, the Court found
a common law right to access court records, but not necessarily a
constitutionally protected right to access.129 Nonetheless, the Court
124. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 555 (considering fourth retrial of
accused murderer); see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for Cty. of Riverside,
478 U.S. 1, 3 (1986) (determining “whether petitioner ha[d] a First Amendment right of access to
the transcript of a preliminary hearing growing out of a criminal prosecution”); see also Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 596 (1982) (examining whether
state can exclude press from testimony of minor rape victims during trial).
125. In a case decided before Richmond Newspapers, (never expressly overruled but limited in
its application by subsequent cases) the Supreme Court found that closing a suppression hearing
was appropriate under the particular circumstances of that case. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 368–69 (1979). While Richmond Newspapers and the line of cases following it never
overruled Gannett, it is worth noting that Gannett stated there is no constitutionally protected right
of access, and reasoned that the constitutional protection of an open trial is personal to the
defendant. See id. at 391–94. Richmond and its progeny, as noted in the text, found a
constitutionally protected interest in public access to the criminal process in the First Amendment,
a right that inures to the good of the public, not the individual. See Privacy and Access to Court
Records, supra note 123, at 949–50.
126. John Gerhart, Access to Court Proceedings and Records, 18 COMM. L. 11, 12 (Summer
2000) (citing Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 10).
127. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 13–14; see also Privacy and Access to Court Records,
supra note 123, at 948 (discussing the First Amendment right for public admittance at trial).
128. Privacy and Access to Court Records, supra note 123, at 948.
129. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608–09 (1978). Ultimately, the Court
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noted: “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right
to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial
records and documents.”130 In addition to the common law right, many
circuit courts have recognized a qualified constitutionally protected right
to access court documents—including plea agreements, sentencing
motions, and even docketing systems—based on the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases, decided after Nixon. These courts typically
apply the two-part test and the strict scrutiny standard described above to
challenges to access.131
Courts and law enforcement have responded by making a vast trove of
records available. “Today, almost all states have publicly available
Internet databases of criminal records.”132 The federal courts’ Internet
search engine provides access to federal court records and includes a
search-by-name index.133
One Supreme Court case that must be distinguished is U.S. Department
of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.134 The case
involved a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request by reporters
seeking FBI criminal identification records, or rap sheets. The FBI denied
the request, citing one of FOIA’s explicit exemptions, and the Court
upheld that denial.135 The Court’s decision to deny access turned on its
interpretation of FOIA’s privacy exception and, more important, on its
determination that the material being sought did not constitute a public
record of a criminal proceeding.136 The rap sheets being sought were a
compilation of information submitted by a variety of sources, and as such
were an agency record (a FOIA term of art) and not a record of “what the
government was up to.”137 The Court reasoned that in the case of FOIA,
denied access to twenty-two hours of President Nixon’s secret tapes that had been played at the
criminal trial of the Watergate conspirators, relying on an explicit provision by Congress regarding
how such historical presidential materials would be archived and disseminated. See id. at 610.
130. Id. at 597.
131. See Gerhart, supra note 126, at 14 (discussing the two-part test that asks whether this has
been traditionally open to the public and then if public access would play a significant role); see
also Privacy and Access to Court Records, supra note 123, at 948–49 (explaining that right of
public admittance at trial equals republican self-government).
132. Roberts, supra note 5, at 328.
133. Privacy and Access to Court Records, supra note 123, at 922.
134. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 749
(1989) [hereinafter “Reporters Comm.”].
135. Id. at 753, 780.
136. Id. at 765.
137. See id. at 751–52 (explaining that rap sheets are compiled by the FBI from information
submitted by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies, and include vast amounts of
information). The Court noted that the sheer volume of records, the amount of information
contained for each individual, and the number of sources supplying records often results in records
that contain incorrect or incomplete information, and sometimes information about persons other
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the statute giveth, and the statute taketh away. Because the material did
not constitute a record of a criminal proceeding per se, any right of access
that existed was created by Congress through FOIA, and that right of
access could be, and in fact was, limited by the nine congressionally
created exemptions to FOIA’s right of access.138 The Court found that
Exemption 7(C) protected these particular agency records.139 In reaching
its conclusion that important privacy concerns were involved, the Court
recognized a crucial principle in modern privacy jurisprudence: Large
compilations of information that previously may have been publicly
available, but that had been scattered about and difficult to access, create
dangerous threats to personal privacy when accumulated in ways that
make them readily accessible.140
C. Restricting Publication of Criminal Records and Proceedings
Given the protection offered the right of access to criminal proceedings
and to the records of those proceedings, might it be possible to restrict the
publication or dissemination of sensitive information once obtained?
Again, the answer is no—indeed, an even more resounding no. Efforts to
prohibit or punish publication of legally obtained materials have been
struck down consistently by the Supreme Court. As the Court reasoned
in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, “[w]e are reluctant to embark on a
course that would make public records generally available to the media
but forbid their publication.”141 While the Court insists that there is no
absolute prohibition, a line of cases beginning with Cox has consistently
refused to punish or prohibit accurate reporting of even the most sensitive
and sensational information.
In Cox, a reporter learned the name of a rape and murder victim who
was a minor because the reporter was in the courtroom at the time the
defendants pleaded guilty to the crime. The reporter then disclosed the
victim’s name in his broadcast report about the proceedings. The victim’s
than the person whose record it is supposed to be. Id.
138. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
139. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. Exemption 7(C) permits (but does not require) an
agency to refuse to release law enforcement records whose production “‘could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.’” See id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7)(C) (2012)).
140. See id. at 763–71. As noted below, it is the ready access made possible by sophisticated
search engines that compounds the problems created by the existence of criminal records. This
concept informed the weight the Court gave Exemption 7(C)’s privacy interests. Further, the Court
distinguished these compiled records noting “when the information is in the Government’s control
as a compilation, rather than as a record of ‘what the Government is up to,’ the privacy interest
protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while the FOIA-based public interest in disclosure
is at its nadir.” Id. at 780.
141. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
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father sued for invasion of privacy, relying on both a Georgia statute that
criminalized the publication of a rape victim’s name and Georgia’s
common law privacy tort. The Supreme Court struck down the Georgia
statute and held that allowing a privacy claim based on the accurate
publication of judicial records such as this would violate the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.142 The Court explained: “The commission of
crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising
from the prosecutions . . . are without question events of legitimate
concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of
the press to report the operations of government.”143 By labeling judicial
proceedings—and indeed all criminal proceedings—as matters of public
interest, the Court set the bar high, cloaking these matters in the protective
mantle of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny.144
The Court next decided Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.145 In
that case, the judge in a sensational murder trial entered an order
prohibiting publication of any accounts of confessions, admissions, or
facts “strongly implicative” of the accused.146 Because of the posture of
Nebraska Press (a challenge to the order itself, not a defense to
publication in violation of the order), the Court correctly characterized
the issue as involving a prior restraint and imposing what amounted to an
insurmountable hurdle.147 The Court observed that prior restraints come
with a heavy presumption against validity and that the party seeking to
uphold a prior restraint “carries a heavy burden.”148 Despite what the
Court admitted to be the trial judge’s responsible efforts to ensure that the
defendants receive a fair trial in a sensational atmosphere, the Court
struck down the order as violating the Constitution.149 One year later, the
Court decided Oklahoma Publishing v. District Court and struck down a
pretrial order forbidding publication of an 11-year-old murder
defendant’s name and photo—material that had been obtained during a

142. Id. at 491, 496–97.
143. Id. at 492.
144. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitutionalizing the tort
of defamation, which placed a high threshold on the element where the communication in question
relates to either a public figure or a matter of public interest); see also infra notes 165–171
(discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in detail).
145. Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 539 (1976).
146. Id. at 570.
147. See id. at 558 (holding that the respondent now has the burden of showing the justification
for the imposition of the restraint).
148. Id.
149. See id. at 569–70 (resulting from both the specific facts of this case as well as the heavy
burden that is now imposed on the respondent).
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detention hearing in open court.150
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, decided a year after
Oklahoma Publishing, a newspaper publisher was criminally prosecuted
for reporting that a judge was under investigation by a judicial inquiry
panel, in violation of a Virginia statute that prohibited anyone, including
those not involved in the proceeding, from divulging such information.151
Again, the Court held that this proceeding was a matter of public
interest.152 The Court found the Commonwealth’s argument that there
were compelling reasons to keep this information confidential—
specifically, that “the public interest is not served by discussion of
unfounded allegations of misconduct which defames honest judges and
serves only to demean the administration of justice”—unconvincing, and
held that criminal punishment of a third party who published legally
obtained information violated the Constitution.153
Smith v. Daily Mail is the next case in this line of what became virtually
annual forays into this issue. In Smith, the Court considered whether a
statute that prohibited publication of an underage criminal defendant’s
name without permission from the court was constitutional. Again, the
Court struck down the law. The Court began its analysis by stating that it
did not matter whether it viewed the statute as a prior restraint or a
sanction for publishing truthful information because either one “requires
the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity.” 154 Smith
presented slightly different facts than the earlier cases in that the reporters
in Smith did not obtain their information from court records or from being
in the courtroom. Rather, they interviewed people at the crime scene,
engaging in what the Court called “routine newspaper reporting

150. See Oklahoma Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308–11 (1977) (holding that under
Oklahoma law, the judge could have closed the detention hearing and other court proceedings
because they involved a juvenile (although as noted above, the court would have had to make a
case for closure)).
151. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831–32 (1978).
152. The Court stated as follows:
Although it is assumed that judges will ignore the public clamor or media reports and
editorials in reaching their decisions and by tradition will not respond to public
commentary, the law gives “[j]udges as persons, or courts as institutions . . . no greater
immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions.” The operations of the courts
and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.
Id. at 838–39 (alteration in original) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
153. Id. at 840–42.
154. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101–02 (1979). This was surprising since the
Court as recently as three years earlier had dubbed prior restraints “the most serious and the least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
559 (1976).
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techniques.”155 On one hand, this makes the Smith holding slightly less
on point for the specific question at hand—the constitutionality of
restraining or sanctioning publication of judicial proceedings. But it also
vividly demonstrates the futility of attempts to control factual
information—seal it in one place if you will, but the facts remain, and can
be discovered. “The truth is out there.”156
In The Florida Star v. B.J.F., the newspaper discovered and published
a rape victim’s name because a member of the Sheriff’s department
erroneously put a document reporting the crime that included the victim’s
name in a bin in the pressroom.157 As in Smith, the information the
reporter published was, by definition, not part of a public government
record. While police reports left in the pressroom were routinely made
available to the media, Florida law specified that “police reports which
reveal the identity of the victim of a sexual offense are not among the
matters of ‘public record’ which the public, by law, is entitled to
inspect.”158 Nonetheless, consistent with Smith, the Court held that
publishers of legally obtained information that related to a matter of
public interest could not be punished or exposed to legal sanctions.159 But
again, the Court explicitly refused to state a broad rule, noting:
Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication is
automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of
personal privacy within which the State may protect the individual from
intrusion by the press, or even that a State may never punish publication
of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.160

But, in fact, in case after case, even in light of extraordinarily
compelling circumstances, the Court has consistently struck the balance
in favor of permitting access and protecting publication. It seems,
therefore, that efforts to restrict access to information or to prohibit

155. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
156. The X-Files, “Opening Credits” (20th Century Fox Television 1993–2002); see, e.g.,
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). The attorney-client privilege reflects this
same lesson; it protects communication but cannot somehow cloak the facts as they exist in the real
world.
157. The Florida Starr v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526–27 (1989).
158. Id. at 536.
159. See id. at 540–41 (stemming from the need to preserve First Amendment Rights). The
opinion explains as follows:
When a State attempts the extraordinary measure of punishing truthful publication in the
name of privacy, it must demonstrate its commitment to advancing this interest by
applying its prohibition evenhandedly, to the smalltime disseminator as well as the media
giant. Where important First Amendment interests are at stake, the mass scope of
disclosure is not an acceptable surrogate for injury.
Id. at 540.
160. Id. at 541.
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publication of information once lawfully obtained will not survive
constitutional challenges.
These cases also close the door to privacy-based actions for damages
flowing from the publication of truthful information. Indeed, that is what
dooms cases like Briscoe’s and Melvin’s. But what about Ms. Martin’s
claims? The Cox line of cases dealt with truthful information. Ms. Martin
hinged her cause of action on falsity, suing in defamation and false
light.161 Might an individual whose record was expunged sue for
defamation or false light, arguing that according to the law, her record no
longer exists and it is as if she never was accused of or committed the
acts reported? Unlikely, at least outside the boundaries of Orwell’s
Oceania.
IV. TRUE LIES—FALSITY-BASED CLAIMS
“I don’t mind being called a liar. I am. I am a marvelous liar. But I hate
being called a liar when I am telling the perfect truth.”162
In the case that inspired this Article, Ms. Martin alleged that the
publication—specifically, the continued availability of the report of her
arrest—was false as a result of the erasure of that record.163 Can
expungement give rise to a falsity-based cause of action by transforming
once-true reports into false reports? To answer this question, I now
explore defamation and false light, and the requirement of falsity.
A. Defamation: The Elements and the Constitution
To state a claim for defamation, a party must plead a false and
defamatory publication, of and concerning the plaintiff, made with at
least negligence, without an applicable privilege.164 Given the subject
matter involved, the easiest element to prove for the person whose record
is being expunged is defamatory meaning. The Second Restatement
defines defamatory communication as one that “tends to so harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community
or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”165 The
Restatement further identifies imputation of criminal conduct as among
the most serious forms of defamatory communication. 166 Thus, reporting
that someone is guilty of a crime easily clears the threshold. And in light
161.
(2015).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40
PATRICK ROTHFUSS, THE WISE MAN’S FEAR 1002 (DAW Books, 2011).
Martin, 777 F.3d at 550.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Id. at § 559.
Id. at § 570.
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of the collateral impact of simply having a criminal record, reporting even
the charge also clears this hurdle.167 The real issues arise with the
requirement of falsity, especially in light of the constitutionalization of
the tort of defamation.
Early common law did not require the plaintiff to prove falsity as an
element of the prima facie case; the plaintiff was presumed to have a good
reputation, putting the rabbit in the hat regarding falsity. 168 The defendant
could rebut this by carrying the burden of proving truth as an absolute
defense.169 But beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Supreme Court constitutionalized the tort of defamation, placing high
thresholds on some of these elements, especially where the
communication in question relates to a public figure or a matter of public
interest. In Sullivan, the Court carved out protection for even false speech
in order to provide breathing room that the Court reasoned was critical to
ensure the robust debate essential for a functioning democracy and a free
society.170 The Court held that in order to recover damages for a false and
defamatory statement, a public official must show, by clear and
convincing proof, that the publisher either knew the information
communicated was false, or acted with reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of the information.171
The Sullivan standard was later extended to public figures engaged in
matters of public interest.172 Then, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the
Court held that while a private person (as distinct from a public official
or public figure) involved in a matter of public interest (as distinct from
167. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Shirvell, 596 F. App’x 433, 442 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 403 (2015) (discussing how the essence of a defamation claim involves harm to a person’s
reputation); Hatfill v. N.Y. Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 333 (4th Cir. 2005) (discussing how a false
statement that is a matter of public concern must be provable as false before it can be liable under
defamation law); Cianci v. New Times Publ’g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) (discussing the
interplay of opinions and defamation in regards to the press).
168. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986) (noting that common
law presumed that an individual’s reputation is good so statements defaming a person are
presumptively false).
169. See id. (noting the common law rule holds that “[s]tatements defaming [a] person
are . . . presumptively false” but defendant may prove “truth of statements” which provides
“absolute defense”).
170. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (placing
constitutional limits on the states’ ability to impose damages in actions for defamation because of
the need to give speech breathing room).
171. See id. (explaining that any other standard of proof would limit public debate and thus free
speech); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974) (noting that there is a
competing interest between an individual right and the constitutional right to free speech).
172. See Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979) (citing Curtis Publ’g
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162–65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring)) (explaining further that the
standard of bringing a defamation action was not expanded to private individuals).
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a private matter) would not be held to the Sullivan actual malice standard,
the Constitution did impose thresholds on certain elements.173
Specifically, Gertz held that liability could not be imposed without a
showing by clear and convincing evidence of at least fault (understood to
mean at least negligence) with respect to the truth or falsity of the
publication.174
Finally, the last piece critical to this analysis comes with Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps. In Hepps, the Court rejected the common law
rule that presumed falsity and held that the Constitution required the
plaintiff (even a private figure, at least when the matter was of public
interest) to carry the burden of pleading and proving falsity.175
The Sullivan line of cases radically changed the law of defamation by
taking what had been a virtually strict liability tort for which the key
element of falsity could be presumed and imposing what often amounts
to impossibly high barriers to recovery. In doing so, the Court created a
cottage industry surrounding the questions of who is a public figure, what
is a matter of public interest, and how the status of the public figure (i.e.,
public official, public figure, general purpose public figure, limited
purpose public figure, or private figure) intersected with the nature of the
communication (e.g., matter of public interest or newsworthy
material).176
Are expungees limited purpose public figures, private figures
involved in matters of public interest, or simply private figures? Some
courts have categorized criminal defendants as limited purpose public
figures (public figures for the purpose of their involvement in criminal
activity or in the criminal process) and are therefore subject to Sullivan’s
imposition of almost impossible hurdles; other courts have found them to
be private figures involved in a matter of public interest and so subject to
the more forgiving Gertz standards.177 Either interpretation requires the
plaintiff to prove falsity.178
The Supreme Court has never faced categorizing criminal defendants
head on, but one Supreme Court decision involving a witness—

173. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. In the case of Gertz, the matter involved Elmer Gertz, a lawyer,
representing the family of a victim who was shot and killed by a police officer in a civil action
against the police officer. Id. at 325.
174. Id. at 349–50.
175. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986).
176. See Victoria C. Duke, Calumnious News Reporting: Defamatory Law Is More Than Sticks
and Stones for Civic-Duty Participants, 93 NEB. L. REV. 690, 705–21 (2015), for a thorough
discussion of how the consequences of the decision in Sullivan have played out.
177. See id. at 717 (emphasizing the lack of conformity among jurisdictions on this question).
178. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342–43; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298–99 (1964).
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potentially implicated in espionage—provides guidance. In Wolston v.
Reader’s Digest, Ilya Wolston sued Reader’s Digest for defamation.179
Wolston was the nephew of two people who pleaded guilty to
espionage.180 He had been subpoenaed and interviewed several times
regarding this matter.181 At one point he argued that he should not be
forced to travel from Washington, D.C., to New York yet again to be
interviewed about this matter due to his failing mental health.182
Nonetheless, the court ordered him to appear. 183 He refused.184 He then
faced a hearing to show cause why he should not be found in contempt.185
He and his then-pregnant wife appeared to defend his decision at the
hearing, but after she broke down on the stand, he agreed to plead guilty
to the contempt charge and was sentenced to a one-year suspended
sentence with three years of probation conditioned upon his cooperating
with the investigation of Soviet espionage.186 Newspapers covered this
fairly extensively at the time, but after about six weeks, the attention died
down and Wolston “succeeded for the most part in returning to the private
life he had led prior to issuance of the grand jury subpoena.”187 He was
never indicted for espionage or accused of being a spy.188 Many years
later, Reader’s Digest published a book entitled KGB: The Secret Work
of Soviet Secret Agents which identified Wolston as a KGB agent and a
Soviet spy—information Wolston alleged was false.189
In analyzing whether Mr. Wolston was a public figure or a private
figure, the Court emphasized language from Gertz that focused on the
individual’s role in “injecting himself” into the controversy, and
contrasted this with what the Court described as Wolston being “dragged”
into this matter.190 The Court continued, “[a] court must focus on the
179. Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n. Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 160–62 (1979).
180. Id. at 161.
181. Id. at 162.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 163.
186. Id.
187. See id. (discussing that even though fifteen stories were written both in Washington and
New York about these events, Wolston succeeded in returning to his normal life).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 159 (arguing that a short time after these events there were two publications
where Wolston was identified as a Soviet agent); JOHN BARRON, KGB: THE SECRET WORK OF
SOVIET SECRET AGENTS 188 (1974) (demonstrating how simple it was for a person like Wolston
to be identified in a publication).
190. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166–67 (explaining that the fact Wolston voluntarily refrained
from attending the grand jury hearing for fear of encountering publicity does not automatically
render him a public figure). In fact, the language from Gertz cited by Wolston was not quite so
focused on voluntary action by the individual: “More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects
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‘nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation.’”191 The Court concluded that
Wolston, like Elmer Gertz (the lawyer in the Gertz case, who represented
in a civil case the family of a suspected criminal shot by the police), was
a private figure involved in a matter of public interest.192 Especially
relevant here, the Court “reject[ed] the further contention of respondents
that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes
a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues
relating to his conviction.”193 The Court seems to instruct us to look at
the level to which the individual “engaged the attention of the public in
an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved[,]” 194 and so
attained “special prominence in the resolution of public questions. . . .”195
Courts take differing approaches to applying this analysis in the
context of criminal defendants. Is the individual’s action in thrusting
himself or herself into the controversy the crucial determinant? Indeed,
the Court in Gertz suggested that affirmative action on the part of the
individual is important, if not critical, observing that an involuntary
public figure, while theoretically possible, would be “exceedingly
rare.”196 But should the nature of the controversy—its newsworthiness—
play into the analysis? For example, in a thoughtful opinion, the Kansas
Supreme Court struggled with this interplay, concluding that the nature
of the crime had to be considered.197 Thus, while the U.S. Supreme Court
in Wolston focused on the actions of the individual defendant (contrasting
Wolston’s lack of voluntary action in being thrust into a controversy with
the example of a defendant who “use[d] the contempt citation as a
fulcrum to create public discussion about the methods being used in
connection with an investigation or prosecution,” and who therefore
might be found a limited purpose public figure),198 the Kansas court in
Ruebke considered the sensational nature of the triple murder involved

himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a
limited range of issues.” Id. at 164 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)).
191. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.
192. Id. (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352).
193. Id. at 168.
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351).
196. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (explaining that it is extremely unlikely that individuals can
become public figures without intentional action of their own).
197. See generally Ruebke v. Globe Commc’ns Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 601 (Kan. 1987) (finding
that Ruebke was a limited public figure due partially to the fact that the triple murder alleged against
him “by nature was of great concern to the public,” and this public concern “thrust Ruebke into the
forefront of public attention”).
198. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168.
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and the intense media coverage to find the defendant a limited purpose
public figure.199 Similarly, in Marcone v. Penthouse International
Magazine for Men, the Third Circuit found an attorney who was indicted
for allegedly engaging in drug-related activities with his clients to be a
public figure.200 The court carefully distinguished Marcone’s activity as
a lawyer representing drug dealers (in this case, notorious motorcycle
gangs) with the lawyer’s own conduct of engaging in the activities of the
gangs.201 In its public figure analysis, the court looked at more than
Marcone’s actions in thrusting himself into the controversy, explaining:
[T]he status of public figure vel non does not depend upon the desires
of an individual. . . . Comment upon people and activities of legitimate
public concern often illuminates that which yearns for shadow. It is no
answer to the assertion that one is a public figure to say, truthfully, that
one doesn’t choose to be. It is sufficient . . . [that the individual]
voluntarily engaged in a course that was bound to invite attention and
comment.202

In the court’s mind, apparently, engaging in the criminal activity itself
was the course that invited attention and comment, and this was
significant in finding Marcone a limited purpose public figure.203 Recall,
a limited purpose public figure is a public figure only with respect to the
matter of public interest.204 And while it may seem the question answers
itself, given this analysis, it is worth closing the loop and asking: Are
criminal activity and criminal procedures matters of public interest? The
Cox line of cases detailed above, though dealing with the issue from a
slightly different perspective, answers the question with a firm, yes. 205
With this as background, I turn to the viability of an expungee’s cause of
action for defamation—a cause of action that must rise or fall on whether
the expungee can carry the burden of proving falsity.206

199. See Ruebke, 241 Kan. at 600–02 (arguing that what made Ruebke a limited public figure
was the intense media coverage, Ruebke voluntarily turning himself in, and Ruebke’s arrest and
indictment for the triple murders).
200. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1084–86 (3d Cir. 1985).
201. See id. (explaining that when determining whether someone is a public figure, one should
look to the individual’s own actions).
202. Id. at 1084 (quoting Rosanova v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 580 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 1978)).
203. Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1086.
204. See supra notes 176–177 (discussing how some courts have categorized criminal
defendants as limited purpose public figures meaning they are public figures for the purpose of
their involvement in criminal activity).
205. See supra notes 141–161 and accompanying text (arguing that criminal activities are
always a matter of public interest).
206. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 770 (1986).
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1. Establishing Falsity: Constructive Falsity
If an expungee is considered a public figure with respect to her
criminal activity or charges lodged against her for engaging in criminal
activity, in an action for defamation she would be required to prove that
the defendant published the defamatory information with knowledge that
it was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.207 If the
expungee is considered a private figure, and the matter is considered to
be of public interest, she would still be required to prove falsity, but only
that the publisher was negligent with respect to the truth or falsity of the
information.208 In both instances, however, the burden of pleading,
proving, and persuading that the communication was false falls squarely
on the plaintiff, who must prove this element by at least a preponderance
of the evidence.209 Nat Stern aptly described this as making falsity part
of the intrinsic character of a defamation claim.210 Stern’s illumination of
the import of this constitutionally driven requirement correctly grasps
falsity as essential to a defamation claim, and so informs my analysis.
In order for an expungee to prevail in a defamation claim under the
scenarios I have been considering, meeting the Court’s constitutionally
driven “demonstrably-false” requirement would require the Court to
accept a notion of constructive falsity—that is, falsity created by
operation of the expungement law that retroactively changes or erases the
facts of the expungee’s arrest, conviction, or charge. As noted above, the
way the law wields the concept of “constructive” may in fact provide a
way to understand all forms of expungement. That is, constructive means
establishing something that is not and deeming it to be so. We wave our
wand and transform “the character assigned to it in its own essential
nature” by operation of “the mind of the law in its act of construing facts,
conduct, [or] circumstances” to make it what we want it to be.211 The
thing acquires that character “in consequence of the way in which it is
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 776 (discussing that the plaintiff bears the burden of showing falsity before
recovering damages).
210. Nat Stern, The Intrinsic Character of Defamatory Content as Grounds for a Uniform
Regime of Proving Libel, 80 MISS. L.J. 1, 17–18 (2010).
211. Constructive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Revised 4th ed. 1968) (emphasis removed);
see also Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007) (explaining how
“common law legal fiction treated as true a factual assertion that plainly was false . . . ”).
Villanova’s law school chaplain, a non-lawyer and Augustinian friar, once asked as he puzzled over
the law school calendar which described a Monday in December as a “constructive Thursday” what
the term meant. After hearing the explanation (“Well, see Jack, it’s a fiction.”), he chuckled, “So
you just make stuff up and call it a legal concept? Awesome!” The clarity of vision, uninhibited
curiosity and straightforward manner Father Jack Denny, OSA, brought to our friendship and the
law school are much missed since his untimely death in 2016.
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regarded by a rule or policy of law . . . implied [or] made out by legal
interpretation.”212 Expungement takes something that happened and
decrees that it did not, or at least that any record of its happening
conceptually does not exist; the individual involved can “truthfully”
answer, “No, this did not happen,” to a question asking about the
expunged facts (which did, of course, happen). It defies the observation
quoted in the title of this Article that “what happened before is what really
happened,”213 refuting it with Orwellian logic.214
This surely represents good policy in the context of expungement’s
criminal justice goals. The effects of expungement must be applied
beyond the narrow confines of the criminal record itself to have any hope
of mitigating the devastating collateral consequences of a criminal
record—consequences so eloquently described by Judge Gleeson in
explaining his decision to craft a Federal Certificate of Rehabilitation.215
But, as Judge Gleeson216 and so many commentators have noted,
although we would both forgive and forget the criminal history of a
rehabilitated individual in a perfect world, we cannot achieve perfection
in reality.217

212. Constructive, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Revised 4th ed. 1968).
213. See Marshall, supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing how the past is always with
us, and even though it may be said a person is someone new, the past happened first).
214. ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213. “[T]he past is whatever the Party chooses to make
it . . . [W]hen it has been re-created in whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new
version [IS] the past, and no different past can ever have existed.” ORWELL, supra note 2, at 213.
215. See Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 445–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (explaining that
the consequences are not mere trivialities, such as ineligibility to enlist in the military, to serve on
a federal jury, and to receive government benefits); id. at 445 (explaining that even though the
majority of states do not issue a certificate, the “federal system has much to gain from a certification
system”); see also Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83
U. COLO. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012) (citing Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need
for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154
(1999) (stating that collateral consequences “can be more punitive and permanent than a person’s
actual criminal sentence”)).
216. Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 446.
217. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 5, at 327, 343 (discussing the crippling effects of a criminal
record and how sealing and expungement laws are just one way to solve this problem); Rebecca
Vallas & Sharon Dietrich, One Strike and You're Out: How We Can Eliminate Barriers to
Economic Security and Mobility for People with Criminal Records, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 34
(2014),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/VallasCriminalRecordsReport.pdf (discussing a criminal record’s
potential longstanding effects on a person’s economic security, family, and community); Jenny
Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts,
45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 286–89 (2011) (explaining that even misdemeanors can have long
lasting negative effects, especially in an age characterized by access to criminal records available
at the click of a button); Wade, supra note 71, at 23 (arguing that California’s legislative efforts to
limit the harsh effects of a criminal record have not been effective, especially given the
technological developments that have manifested since the legislation was adopted); Starting Over,
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We have already seen that efforts to erase or rewrite history have
limited effect—as futile as attempting to re-capture feathers let loose
from a pillow cut open on a rooftop.218 Similarly, efforts to impose
liability for disclosure of the facts of a criminal record by deeming them
constructively false and imposing defamation damages will not work.
Constructive falsity would allow us to assume the falsity of the report of
a criminal record while simultaneously understanding full well that the
presumption of falsity is not fact.219 Would the Court permit such sleight
of hand? A fair reading of the Supreme Court’s opinions counsel that it
would not. Stern has insightfully described falsity as the “intrinsic
element” of defamation—an intrinsic element firmly anchored as
constitutionally required. In rejecting the common law presumption of
falsity applied to defamatory speech and imposing the requirement that
private-party, public-matter plaintiffs must plead, prove, and persuade on
the element of falsity, the Court understood the potential for unfairness
for deserving defamation plaintiffs who might not be able to meet the
burden of proof, even though the speech involved was in fact false,
defamatory, and damaging.220 The Court observed that on the facts of
Hepps itself, the impact of Pennsylvania’s Shield Statute made imposing
the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff even more onerous—perhaps
impossible—because the media defendants could invoke the Shield
Statute and refuse to divulge their sources, critical to the plaintiff’s ability
to prove falsity and reckless disregard.221 Nonetheless, the Court
reasoned that in order to provide the breathing room necessary to protect
speech, it was willing to insulate even demonstrably false speech from

supra note 59, at 1717–34 (explaining the unforgiving nature of the American criminal justice
system and proposing a legal framework to “limit the scope and duration of collateral legal
penalties”).
218. See supra notes 107–113 and accompanying text (explaining that the efforts to redact
names only consider certain locations, which leaves remaining information in other places).
219. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 319 (2013) (“A legal
fiction is often a ‘factual statement a judge, a legal scholar or a lawyer tells, while simultaneously
understanding full well—and also understanding that the audience understands—that the statement
is not fact.’”).
220. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986) (illustrating the
Court’s understanding). The Court acknowledged,
There will always be instances when the factfinding process will be unable to resolve
conclusively whether the speech is true or false; it is in those cases that the burden of
proof is dispositive. Under a rule forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing
falsity, there will be some cases in which plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the
fact that the speech is in fact false. The plaintiff’s suit will fail despite the fact that, in
some abstract sense, the suit is meritorious.
Id. at 776.
221. Id. at 778–79.
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liability.222
Moreover, the Court’s application of its Sullivan jurisprudence in the
context of rhetorical hyperbole and parody reinforces the message that
the requirement of demonstrable falsity will be strictly enforced. In
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the parody ad in question purported to
quote evangelist Jerry Falwell describing his “first time” as happening
with his mother in an outhouse.223 The Court reasoned that parody cannot
be shown to involve facts, and therefore cannot be shown demonstrably
false.224 Outrageous, harmful and untrue, perhaps, but not false.225
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the Constitution will not permit the
imposition of damages, even in the face of outrageous conduct and
verifiable harm.226
This leads to the conclusion that the Court will not destabilize its
holding in Hepps, and indeed the entire Sullivan line of cases, by
permitting constructive falsity—a legal fiction—to establish the very
element the Court found constitutionally essential to the cause of action.
At best, fictions are viewed with suspicion. Lisa Kern Griffin suggests
that the very name “reveals an underlying sense that there is something
dangerously deceptive about them.”227 Hepps rejected the use of fiction
when it disallowed application of the long-standing concept of
presumptive falsity (a form of fiction) and imposed the burden on the
plaintiff to prove falsity with convincing clarity, finding the presumption
of falsity constitutionally impermissible.228 The fiction of constructive

222. See id. (discussing the First Amendment’s requirement that in defamation cases the Court
will protect some falsehood and thereby protect speech that matters).
223. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) (explaining that this parody was
modeled after actual comparison advertisements that included interviews with celebrities about
their first time drinking Campari Liqueur).
224. Id. at 48–50 (determining parody “could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating
actual facts about the public figure involved[,]” and if something is not factual, it cannot be shown
to be false).
225. Id. at 50.
226. Id.; see also Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (noting that
the word “blackmail” used to criticize public official’s bargaining tactics was “no more than
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet[,]” and therefore could not support action for defamation).
227. Griffin, supra note 219, at 320. Griffin emphasizes her point, citing the movie A Civil
Action, where a lawyer explains that the judge will ask “the jury to ‘create a fiction that will stand
for the truth, but won’t be the truth.’” Id. at 304 n.125 (quoting A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone
Pictures 1998)). To be fair, the single publication rule discussed above is itself a legal fiction, but
one which the Supreme Court has embraced. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
777 (1984). The Court noted that the rule prevented the unnecessary “drain of libel cases on judicial
resources” and protected defendants from harassment resulting from multiple suits. Id. In Keeton,
the rule inured to the benefit of the plaintiff who was able to invoke the rule to shop for the longest
defamation statute of limitation in the country. Id. at 778–81.
228. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986).
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falsity would be rooted in a presumption even more constitutionally
unsound: it would take a constitutionally required element and, in the face
of actual knowledge to the contrary, declare it established. The
parody/rhetorical hyperbole line of cases even more convincingly
compels this conclusion. If the Court would not weaken the requirement
of factual falsity by finding false implication in the parody cases,
including one as outrageous as the Falwell parody, it cannot be expected
to permit an expungee to wave the magic wand of expungement over the
verifiable and truthful facts in an official public record of a criminal or
judicial proceeding, and in doing so, deem them (constructively) false.
2. Establishing Falsity: Changed Circumstances
An expungee might take another tack in seeking to establish falsity, an
approach suggested by the facts of the Martin case. Implicit in Lorraine
Martin’s demand that the media defendants “correct” their reports (that
is, delete them) to reflect the erasure of her criminal record, and her
subsequent claims for defamation and false light based on their refusal to
do so, is the notion that failure to delete the reports causes the once-true
information to become false.229 The theory posits that information, which
was true when it was published, could become false for the purpose of
imposing liability in a defamation action by virtue of subsequent events
or changed circumstances.230 This, so the reasoning goes, is especially so
in the context of online publications, primarily because they are easily
searchable and are arguably republished each time a reader searches and
pulls up the article.231 Further, unlike the case of print publications, it is
relatively simple to delete the article entirely (except, of course, for
already downloaded versions).
At least for media defendants, this theory will not work to establish

229. This was not directly addressed by the Martin court, but the issue was raised in the
defendant’s brief. See Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 10–21, Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d
546 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3315-cv) [hereinafter “Brief for the Defendants”] (arguing that
Connecticut’s Erasure Statute is limited to expunging official government records of criminal
charges that are not pursued, and does not impose a duty on the press to withdrawal or update
reports of erased charges); see also Brief for the Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellees at 11–14, Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546
(2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-3315-cv) [hereinafter “Amicus Curiae Brief”] (citing Strada v. Conn.
Newspapers, Inc., 477 A.2d 1005, 1010 (Conn. 1984) (arguing that “[j]ournalism would be
impossible if subjects of stories could routinely sue over material that they would have liked to see
included in the story,” and adding that “an omission can constitute libel only when there are
‘additional material facts which, if reported, would have changed the tone of the article’”)).
230. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 229, at 10–21; Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 229,
at 11–14.
231. Brief for the Defendants, supra note 229, at 10–21; Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 229,
at 11–14.
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falsity because of the operation of the single publication rule. The single
publication rule, which has been universally adopted, provides that “[a]ny
one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television
broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate
communication” constitutes just one publication and gives rise to one
cause of action.232 The single publication rule most often arises when
courts must determine when the statute of limitations begins to run.233
Functionally, it means a defamatory publication must be judged at the
moment of its first publication.234 That is, all the elements of a cause of
action must be assessed at a single moment of publication—to wit, that
there was a communication, of and concerning the plaintiff, that is
defamatory and demonstrably false.235
As with any emerging technology, the advent of online publications
raised the question of whether the single publication rule would apply to
online media. The majority of courts considering the question have held
that the single publication rule applies to online publications, and the fact
that each view “reloads” the article does not make each view a new
publication.236 The New York case of Firth v. State has been cited as the
most influential of these rulings.237 Firth and the other cases finding that
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
233. See Note, The Single Publication Rule in Libel: A Fiction Misapplied, 62 HARV. L. REV.
1041, 1042 (1949) (exhibiting the single publication most frequently used to determine when libel
action is barred by statute of limitations); see, e.g., Adeline A. Allen, Twibel Retweeted: Twitter
Libel and the Single Publication Rule, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 63, 66 (2014) (discussing the single
publication rule, but only in the context of statutes of limitations); see also “Single Publication
Rule” Applied Online, 7 No. 5 Cyberspace Law. 17 (July/Aug. 2002) (noting that the single
publication rule is applied by courts to “determine statute of limitations”).
234. See Lori A. Wood, Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule, 81 B.U. L. REV.
895, 897–99 (2001) (noting that common law traditionally treated each of a party’s several
communications as a separate publication, and that the single publication rule “developed . . . in
response to the problems caused by the advent of mass publication” to protect defendants from
“multiple lawsuits and undue harassment that might result from the dissemination of large-scale
communication”); see, e.g., Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 465 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that although
a website may be altered or viewed multiple times after publication, the statute of limitations is not
retriggered).
235. Wood, supra note 234, at 898 (“[The single publication rule] combines the right to a cause
of action in each jurisdiction where the defendant disseminated the defamatory material into a
single cause of action in any one jurisdiction where the dissemination occurred.”).
236. See, e.g., Pippen v. NBC Universal Media, LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 615 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Every
state court that has considered the question applies the single-publication rule to information
online.”); see also Wood, supra note 234, at 895–96, 899 (noting that the trend in the majority of
jurisdictions is to apply the single publication rule to Internet publications and quoting Chief Justice
Deyer of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, who recognizes the single publication rule allows a
single wrong for a single publication).
237. See Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137, 143–44 (5th Cir.
2007) (noting that most courts considering the issue applied single publication rule to Internet
publications and that most influential case on the issue is Firth v. State). The small handful of courts
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the single publication rule applies to online publications get it right.
Indeed, conceptually, accessing an online source must be understood as
the digital equivalent of pulling a book off a shelf or pulling a newspaper
off the rack in a library periodicals room. As the court reasoned in Firth,
rather than supporting the argument that the single publication rule does
not apply to online publications, the nature of the Internet makes an even
more compelling case for applying the single publication rule.238
Otherwise, the publisher would face “endless retriggering of the statute
of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants.
Inevitably, there would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open,
pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet, which
is, of course, its greatest beneficial promise.”239
As applied, the single publication rule mandates that a snapshot is
taken at the moment of publication, and that snapshot defines the
publication for purposes of suit. Thus, the single publication rule
functions to require that all elements of the cause of action exist at the
moment of publication.240 Therefore, the single publication rule, applied
here, forecloses an argument that by not removing the original report after
expungement or erasure, the once-true information became false. It had
to be false at the moment of publication, and it was not.

that have found the single publication rule does not apply to online publications in recent years
have relied on particular factors that distinguish the cases. See, e.g., Larue v. Brown, 333 P.3d 767,
772–73 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (finding the single publication rule did apply to online publications
generally, but the fact that publication drew comments from readers and publishers responded
constituted republication); Swafford v. Memphis Individual Prac. Assoc., No. 02A01-9612-CV0031, 1998 WL 281935, at *8–11 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (finding the publication in
question, which was one of many reports contained in online database updated with new reports
and accessed by individual readers, was not subject to single publication rule because there was no
“aggregate publication”).
238. Firth, 775 N.E.2d at 466.
239. Id. The court observed:
[M]any Web sites are in a constant state of change, with information posted sequentially
on a frequent basis. For example, this Court has a Web site which includes its decisions,
to which it continually adds its slip opinions as they are handed down. Similarly, Web
sites are used by news organizations to provide readily accessible records of newsworthy
events as they occur and are reported. . . . A rule applying the republication exception
under the circumstances here would either discourage the placement of information on
the Internet or slow the exchange of such information, reducing the Internet’s unique
advantages. In order not to retrigger the statute of limitations, a publisher would be
forced either to avoid posting on a Web site or use a separate site for each new piece of
information.
Id. at 467.
240. See Pippen, 734 F.3d at 615 (noting claim for relief for defamation is complete at the time
of first publication).
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B. False Light
Before moving on, it is appropriate to take a moment to consider
whether defamation’s step-sibling, false light, might offer the expungee
a viable cause of action. To establish a claim for false light, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant publicized a matter concerning the plaintiff
that placed the plaintiff in a false light.241 That false light must be “highly
offensive to a reasonable person.”242 At its heart, false light is a
defamation cause of action lurking within Prosser’s original four privacy
torts. Its contours are vague, and it is not clear exactly how “highly
offensive” falsity differs from “defamatory” falsity, but most consider it
a lower standard.243 Defamatory falsity focuses on verifiable and serious
injury to reputation.244 Definitions of defamatory falsity typically require
the utterance to subject the individual to “obloquy, odium, shame,
disgrace or other forms of discredit or harm to reputation[,]” and cause
the person to be shunned or avoided.245 The Restatement goes right to the
point, stating that a defamatory communication “tends so to harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community. . . .”246 On the other hand, false light cases turn “entirely on
falsity rather than [reputational] harm; the actual and substantial injury
element needed to maintain the case has become an easily satisfied
formality which seems really to mean only that the plaintiff was irritated
enough to sue.”247 Many commentators criticize false light because, as
noted above, it is duplicative of defamation. Further, to the extent an
independent cause of action exists, it provides a remedy for an
inconsequential “harm” and, by evading some of defamation’s strict
requirements, it threatens the very free and robust speech the Court’s
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“One who gives
publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is
subject to liability. . . . ”).
242. Id. at § 652E(a).
243. See supra notes 232–233 and accompanying text (discussing the false light doctrine in
conjunction with the single publication doctrine).
244. See Eric Meyer Raudenbush, Note, Variations on a Theme: Application of Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc. to a Spectrum of Misquotation Libel Cases, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1441,
1476 n.29 (1991) (noting that “the elements of the false light tort . . . are substantially analogous to
those of the libel tort, although the false light action is designed to compensate the plaintiff for
injured feelings, as opposed to injured reputation”).
245. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1127 (2000). Dobbs indicates these terms “refer to
the same general idea.” Id.
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). While most definitions
of defamatory meaning focus on injury to reputation, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the Supreme Court
held that harm to reputation was not constitutionally required, and permitted recovery under Florida
law for personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering. 424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976).
247. Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 364, 396 (1989).
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Sullivan line of cases seeks to protect.248 Most troubling, some courts
have found that the publication of even truthful information can give rise
to a false light claim if that truthful information can be construed to imply
something false and offensive.249 Diane Zimmerman warned of the
danger in permitting claims of false light by implication, which she notes
can be used to permit “recoveries for false light claims based on a series
of dubious inferences.”250
Despite scholarly hostility toward false light claims, a number of
jurisdictions recognize the cause of action.251 Does false light provide a
remedy for the expungee? Again, the answer must be no, and again
because of the requirement of falsity. In Time v. Hill, the Supreme Court
extended the Sullivan constitutional mandates to false light claims,
requiring, at least in the context of matters of public interest, that the
defendant have published the material with “knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard for” its truth or falsity. 252
The falsity may be directly stated, or implied by manipulation of
information, but falsity is still the essence of the tort. Thus, in false light,
as in defamation, falsity provides the fulcrum, or using Stern’s language,
the intrinsic character of the claim is falsity—an essential element
mandated by the Constitution.253 While the Supreme Court has not said
so specifically, the logic of its jurisprudence in this area drives the
conclusion that in false light, as in defamation, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof with respect to falsity.254 Again, the expungee cannot
248. See, e.g., Sandra F. Chance & Christina M. Locke, When Even the Truth Isn’t Good
Enough: Judicial Inconsistency in False Light Case Threatens Free Speech, 9 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 546, 568–71 (2011) (discussing the inconsistencies with the First Amendment values and the
false light claim); James B. Lake, Restraining False Light: Constitutional and Common Law Limits
on a “Troublesome Tort”, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 625, 627, 639–40 (2009) (arguing that because the
First Amendment and false light claims are inconsistent, jurisdictions should impose the limits of
defamation law on false light); J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 783, 785, 883, 886–87 (1992) (showing how false light does not add anything distinctive);
Zimmerman, supra note 247, at 397–402 (discussing the Sullivan line of cases and false light
claims).
249. See Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 10-cv-1710, 2013 WL 1286662, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28,
2013) (explaining false light can be established when the defendant selectively published,
knowingly or recklessly, truthful statements in a manner which created a false impression, and this
despite accuracy of individual statements because of the intentional presentation of material in a
manner that creates the false inference), aff’d, 744 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2014).
250. Zimmerman, supra note 247, at 416.
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E: Case Citations (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(defining the cause of action of false light and listing cases from most states).
252. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88 (1967).
253. Stern, supra note 210, at 17–18.
254. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating “defendant may not
be held liable for the tort of false light” absent “proof of falsity and some level of fault”). The
Supreme Court has not directly spoken on whether Hepps applies to false light causes of action,
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prove falsity when what is published is truthful information obtained
from a public record.
Constructive falsity would not work any better to satisfy the
requirement of falsity here than in the context of defamation. As noted,
the Supreme Court has applied its Sullivan jurisprudence to false light.255
Therefore, the Court’s insistence on proof of falsity as essential to the
cause of action forecloses invoking constructive falsity as shown by the
analysis above. Even applying the dubious false-light-by-implication
doctrine does not help the expungee. To the extent there is an implication
(as opposed to an outright statement), the implication is true.
Similarly, the single publication rule, which is applied to false light
cases, forecloses an argument that the subsequent expungement or
erasure would render the original truthful report false.256
V. FORCING “CORRECTION” OF THE RECORD?
Turning back to the case that inspired this Article, did Ms. Martin
perhaps get it close to right in the first place? Recall the facts of that case:
Following Lorraine Martin’s arrest and the filing of drug charges against
her, online news outlets published articles reporting the arrests and
charges.257 When the state did not prosecute the charges against Ms.

but given its holding and rationale in Falwell, which applied Hepps to an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, it is reasonable to conclude, as the court in Machleder did, that
Hepps will apply to false light causes of action. See id. (citing Hepps when determining there must
be proof of falsity and fault); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)
(holding that there must be a false statement of fact and actual malice in order to recover).
255. See supra notes 252–254 and accompanying text (noting that in Hill, 385 U.S. at 387–88,
the Supreme Court extended the Sullivan constitutional mandate to false light claims).
256. See Graboff v. Am. Ass’n of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 559 F. App’x 191, 194–95 (3d Cir.
2014) (applying the single publication rule to false light, which the court found very similar to
defamation, and finding that a continuously posted Internet article did not constitute separate acts
of republication); Hoai Thanh v. Ngo, Civ. No. PJM 14-448, 2016 WL 3958584, at *4–5 (D. Md.
July 22, 2016) (applying single publication rule to false light claim and noting that to overcome the
rule, plaintiff must show that material was republished, rather than merely available online) aff’d
sub nom, Hoai Thanh v. Hien T. Ngo, No. 17-1110, 2017 WL 3327821 (4th Cir. Aug. 4, 2017) (per
curium, unpublished decision); Parnigoni v. St. Columba’s Nursery Sch., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19
(D.D.C. 2010) (single publication rule applies to false light claims).
257. Martin v. Hearst Corp., 777 F.3d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 40
(2015). The first article reported:
A mother and her two sons were arrested and charged with numerous drug violations
Aug. 20 after police received information that a pair of brothers were selling marijuana
in town. The arrests were part of a two-month-long investigation, which came to a head
last week when police executed a search and seizure warrant. Police arrested Edward
Martin, 22, Christopher Martin, 20, and their mother, Lorraine Martin, 52, all of 382
Riversville Road. Police said 12 grams of marijuana, scales, plastic bags and drug
paraphernalia were found inside the residence.
Debra Friedman, Mother and Son Charged with Drug Offenses, GREENWICH TIME (Aug. 26, 2010,
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Martin, and ultimately entered a nolle prosequi, the arrest records were
erased (actually sealed, but with real juice behind the sealing) pursuant to
Connecticut’s Erasure Statute, and Ms. Martin requested that the
publications remove the story of her arrest and charge.258 The
publications refused.259 The report remained available online, and can be
accessed even now.260 Suppose instead of asking the publications to
delete the report, she asked instead that they publish a correction or a
clarification—specifically to report the accurate facts that the charges
were never prosecuted and her record had been expunged? Such an
approach extrapolates from retraction statutes that operate in defamation
law.
In the context of defamation actions, some jurisdictions allow a
defendant to mitigate the damages owed to the plaintiff, or to avoid the
possibility of punitive damages, by preemptively retracting the
defamatory statements.261 Other jurisdictions require the plaintiff to
request a retraction and give the publisher the opportunity to do so before
seeking certain types of damages.262 Might these retraction statutes
provide support for requiring a clarification or a correction? Probably not.
To begin with, the situations are materially different in two ways: First,
retraction statutes, by definition, apply to communications that are
punishable—that is, they assume the communications in question are
arguably false and defamatory.263 Despite the broad-reaching impact of
its Sullivan line of cases, the Supreme Court has never held that
defamatory statements themselves are worthy of constitutional
protection. Rather, the Court realized that truthful speech needs breathing
8:06 PM), http://www.greenwichtime.com/local/article/Mother-and-sons-charged-with-drugoffenses-633280.php.
258. Martin, 777 F. 3d at 549.
259. Id.
260. See e.g., Friedman, supra note 257 (for example, as of the time this Article was published,
the Greenwich Time article could be accessed online).
261. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (2017) (barring plaintiff from recovering punitive damages
if defendant publishes retraction); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11 (2017) (prohibiting plaintiff from
recovering punitive damages if defendant publishes retraction or if plaintiff fails to request
retraction); MASS. GEN. LAWS 231 § 93 (2016) (allowing defendant to use retraction as way to
mitigate damages recoverable by plaintiff); WIS. STAT. § 895.05 (2016) (barring plaintiff from
recovering punitive damages if defendant publishes timely correction).
262. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 6-5-186 (2016) (requiring plaintiff to ask for retraction five
days prior to filing suit and for defendant to refuse to retract for plaintiff to be eligible to recover
punitive damages); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.06 (West 2016) (allowing plaintiff to only recover
special damages unless he or she demands retraction and is refused); O R. REV. STAT. § 31.210
(2017) (requiring plaintiff to either demand retraction or show that defendant “intended to defame
the plaintiff” to be able to recover general damages); WIS. STAT. § 895.05 (2017) (requiring
plaintiff to ask for retraction before filing suit).
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing several state retraction statutes).
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room, and free and robust debate requires some margin of error to avoid
a chilling effect.264 So, the false and defamatory statement itself is not
worthy of protection. Rather, to avoid chilling robust debate, courts do
not permit the law to cut too close to the bone in imposing damages.265 In
short, to avoid making speakers timorous and risking stifling truthful
speech, some false speech must slip through. But that false speech itself
does not have constitutional value. The cases hold that under the proper
circumstances (that is, clearing the Sullivan bar), courts can impose
penalties (or in this case, burdens) on false and defamatory speech.266
This forms the foundation for the retraction statutes—they impose a
burden, but only on publishers of defamatory speech. However, the
expungees’ cases involve publication of truthful speech, which is
constitutionally protected.267 This represents an important distinction.
Second, the retraction statutes do not require that a retraction or
correction be printed.268 Instead, the statutes provide a means to mitigate
damages in a suit by permitting the defendant to elect to publish a
retraction in response to a suit or to the defamed person’s timely request
to do so.269 By contrast, the remedy of requiring correction would
mandate that a media outlet publish additional information amending an
original report to reflect the fact that the criminal record reported on was
expunged. This falls squarely in the First Amendment bramble bush of
compelled speech.
The Supreme Court is nimble and imaginative in interpreting the
simple words “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. . . .”270 The Court did not hesitate to read
264. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341, 348 (1974) (recognizing that “[t]he
First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters,”
but also “the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name”).
265. See id. at 348 (establishing a “boundary between the competing concerns,” that of “the
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation,”
while at the same time “shield[ing] the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability
for defamation”).
266. The Sullivan line of cases, discussed supra notes 170–206, set out the circumstances. See,
e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (stating that a public official may
“recover[] damages for defamatory falsehood relating to official conduct” only if “he proves that
the statement was made with” knowledge or reckless disregard for truth or falsity); see also Gertz,
418 U.S. at 347 (“[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may
[set] . . . standard of liability for a publisher . . . of defamatory falsehood.”).
267. See e.g. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986) (noting that the
Constitution requires plaintiffs to bear the burden of showing the speech at issue is false); Garrison
v. State of La., 379 U.S. 64, 73-74, 78 (1964) (applying the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan,
holding that the Constitution absolutely prohibits punishment of truthful speech).
268. See supra note 262 and accompanying text (noting several state retraction statutes).
269. See id.
270. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Miami Herald Publ’g. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–
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“abridging” to include compelling speech when it comes to government
interference with speech.
While some commentators have observed that the entirety of the
Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence can be hard to reconcile, that
critique only applies to some of the less concrete applications (for
example, requiring union dues that go to political causes, or requiring
property owners to permit demonstrators to express their views on
property open to the public).271 In cases of true compelled speech, where
a speaker is forced to express content that is not the speaker’s own (such
as the proposal to force media outlets to add information about
expungements to published reports of criminal records), the Court has
spoken clearly, striking down such attempts. In Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, the Court unanimously struck down a Florida statute
requiring newspapers that published criticisms of candidates for public
office to publish the candidates’ responses to the criticisms.272 The Court
found that “[c]ompelling editors or publishers to publish that which
‘reason tells them should not be published’ . . . operates as a command in
the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish
specified matter.”273 The Court also concluded that forcing a newspaper
to allocate space and resources to the mandated responses exacted a
penalty, specifically the cost of printing and the necessity to allocate
limited resources to the reply instead of other content.274 The Court added
an important concern with intrusion into the editorial process:
57 (1974) (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244–45 (1936)) (“Governmental
restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to
constitutional limitations on governmental powers.”); supra notes 141–161 and accompanying text
(citing to United States Supreme Court cases where the issue presented was the restriction of
publication of criminal records and proceedings).
271. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights
After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1048–50 (2013) (discussing what
constitutes compelled speech).
272. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247, 258 (1974). In contrast, the Court has permitted similar right to
reply provisions to be applied to broadcast media, citing the fact that the airwaves are finite,
requiring the government to allocate them; thus, broadcasters hold a license as trustees of the public.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 400–01 (1969) (holding that an FCC order
requiring radio station to provide a person attacked in broadcast with time for response, among
other things, did not violate the First Amendment because, “of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies,
the Government’s role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable
without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views,”
reasoning that “existing broadcasters have often attained their present position because of their
initial government selection in competition . . . [resulting in] advantages [that] are the fruit of a
preferred position conferred by the Government”). Whether this rationale will continue to justify
the distinction in light of the extraordinary expansion of broadcast capacity remains to be seen.
273. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256 (quoting Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244–45).
274. Id. at 256–57 (explaining that as an economic reality, the newspaper cannot indefinitely
expand its space to accommodate the mandated responses).
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Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with a
compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication of
news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to
clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into
the function of editors.275

On its face, Tornillo appears to foreclose the proposal to require
publishers to print corrections or amendments to their published reports.
To be sure, there are differences that matter here. But are they enough to
clear the Court’s concerns?
As noted above, online publications should be considered conceptually
comparable to traditional publications.276 But there are differences.
Adding a correction to an online report can be done quite easily and with
minimum cost. And, while accessing an online report and pulling a
newspaper in a library are in principle the same, the fact that search
engines make the online version much more easily accessible might
justify imposing a modest burden to correct the report. However, the
Court’s holding in Tornillo likely forecloses this option as well. As noted
above, in addition to the burden imposed by the expense, the Court was
concerned about insinuating government into the editorial process.277 The
Court expressed concern that requiring the publication of candidates’
replies would necessarily result in the publisher not being able to print
other content, causing impermissible intrusion on the editorial process.278
In addition, the Court worried that the specter of being forced to publish
replies might make publishers become cautious about reporting on
candidates—the archetypal robust debate the First Amendment
protects.279 So, while the expense or commitment of resources might be
minimal for an online publisher required to publish a correction or
clarification of its report, the insinuation of the government into the
editorial process still represents a real and dangerous threat—indeed, it
might be the real danger. The Court in Tornillo foreshadowed this
possibility and noted its concern: “The choice of material to go into a
275. Id. at 258.
276. See supra Part IV.A.2 (explaining that an “online source must be understood as the digital
equivalent of pulling a book off a shelf or pulling a newspaper off the rack in a library periodicals
room”).
277. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964))
(“[U]nder the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or
reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably ‘dampens the vigor and limits the
variety of public debate.’”).
278. Id. (“[I]t is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to
infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a government agency
determines or a statute commands the readers should have available.”).
279. Id. (suggesting that editors may choose to avoid controversy and thus reduce political
coverage).
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newspaper . . . and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial control and
judgment.”280 The Court could not see “how governmental regulation of
this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees. . . .”281
VI. A MODEST PROPOSAL: VOLUNTARY CORRECTION
In the end, law cannot fix the problems created by the existence and
truthful reporting of a criminal record, at least without doing serious
damage to First Amendment principles. Government mandated
publication of corrections will not work either. Thus, most of the potential
fixes threaten grave harm to essential constitutional principles, and in all
likelihood, fall well short of offering a real remedy anyway. If the law
cannot fix what clearly amounts to a severe and unjust harm, are there
any other options? Perhaps.
While the Constitution bars the government from requiring a news
source to publish amending or correcting information, journalists could
voluntarily agree to do so as a best practice. Journalists do not have a
binding code of ethics comparable to lawyers, but they do have guiding
principles and voluntary ethics rules. For example, the Society of
Professional Journalists (“SPJ”) publishes a non-binding code that was
updated as recently as 2014.282 SPJ describes the code as “a statement of
abiding principles,” noting that the code “is not a set of rules,” but “rather
a guide that encourages all who engage in journalism to take
responsibility for the information they provide, regardless of the
medium.”283 Further, most news outlets publish their own codes of ethics
and hold their reporters accountable to these codes.284
Despite popular disdain for the media, journalists traditionally aspire
to high standards, while wrestling with how to get to the news, get it right,

280. Id. at 258.
281. Id.
282. See generally SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISM (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:49
PM), http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp [hereinafter “SPJ Code of Ethics”] (demonstrating that
journalists have aspirational but not binding codes of ethics).
283. Id.
284. See, e.g., Ethical Journalism: A Handbook of Values and Practices for the News and
Editorial
Departments,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
2004),
https://www.nytco.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/3/NYT_Ethical_Journalism_0904-1.pdf (illustrating one exemplary code of
ethics);
Handbook
of
Journalism:
Standards
and
Values,
REUTERS,
http://handbook.reuters.com/index.php?title=Standards_and_Values (last visited Sept. 7, 2017)
(listing ten absolutes required of all Reuters reporters); The Washington Post Standards and Ethics,
AM. SOC’Y OF NEWS EDITORS, http://asne.org/content.asp?contentid=335 (last visited Sept. 7,
2017) (reflecting another well-written code of ethics).
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get it out, and survive in an increasingly competitive atmosphere.285 In
the context of criminal justice, the SPJ’s Code explicitly acknowledges
the tensions involved in handling criminal records, stating that journalists
should “[b]alance a suspect’s right to a fair trial with the public’s right to
know” and “[c]onsider the implications of identifying criminal suspects
before they face legal charges.”286
Journalists also understand the implications of both longevity and
ready accessibility in the context of online news. Editor Kathy English
calls this the “longtail of the news” in a report she authored under the
auspices of the Associated Press Media Editors (“APME”) Online
Journalism Credibility Project.287 Her paper focused on the rapidly

285. See Why Doesn’t SPJ Enforce its Code of Ethics?, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISM,
http://www.spj.org/ethicsfaq.asp (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) (explaining “all journalism ethics is a
balancing act between often conflicting responsibilities” and giving examples of that balancing act:
“Seek truth and report it . . . [but] [m]inimize harm[; a]ct independently [but b]e accountable”); see
also Lene Bech Sillesen, Exploring Ethics Through Journalism Hotlines: How News Associations
Are Keeping Up with Changing Principles, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REV. (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://archives.cjr.org/behind_the_news/ethics_hotlines.php (discussing how “the Online News
Association is crowdsourcing a project that allows journalists to build individual codes of ethics on
the premise that one standardized code can no longer represent everyone”); compare CARL
BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN 79 (Simon & Schuster 1974)
(describing Washington Post’s Watergate reporting: “Gradually, an unwritten rule was evolving:
unless two sources confirmed a charge involving activity likely to be considered criminal, the
specific allegation was not used in the paper.”), with TOM GOLDSTEIN, JOURNALISM AND TRUTH:
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 16 (Northwestern University Press 2007) (arguing two-source rule and
hard-and-fast rule of not relying on anonymous sources “would be the loss of a tremendous amount
of [important and accurate] news” (citing James B. Stewart, Consider the Sources, N.Y. TIMES
(July
4,
1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/books/99/07/04/reviews/990704.704stewat.html?mcubz=0)). To be sure,
the media has not always lived up to these aspirations, especially in the highly charged news culture
of the day. However, the shock of the most recent political campaigns, and the emergence of “altnews” and alternative facts may have jolted journalists into self-reflection and a renewed
commitment to such guiding principles. See, e.g., Kyle Pope, An Open Letter to Trump from the
US
Press
Corps,
COLUMBIA
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Jan.
17,
2017),
http://www.cjr.org/covering_trump/trump_white_house_press_corps.php (describing how the
Press Corps plans to interact with President Trump during his presidency); Steven Perlberg, Media
Looks Inward After Donald Trump Surprise, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/media-looks-inward-after-donald-trump-surprise-1478720405
(discussing the disdain for the media and the media’s struggle to compete with social media
platforms); Jim Rutenberg & James Poniewozik, Can the Media Recover from This Election?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/arts/television/after-this-electioncan-the-media-recover.html?_r=0 (describing how the 2017 presidential election affected the
media).
286. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 282 (illustrating difficulties that journalists have with
handling criminal records).
287. See generally Kathy English, The Longtail of News: To Unpublish or Not to Publish,
ASSOCIATED PRESS MANAGING EDITORS ONLINE CREDIBILITY PROJECT (2009),
www.apme.com/resource/resmgr/online_journalism_credibility/long_tail_report.pdf (discussing
the rationale behind “unpublishing” news).
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increasing phenomena (invoked by Ms. Martin in her case) of requests to
“unpublish” articles,288 and editors’ efforts to handle these requests.289
According to English’s research, reports of criminal records, especially
reports involving minor crimes, represent “a significant source” of
requests to unpublish.290 Editors correctly resist such requests as a form
of coercive, content-based censorship. “[T]oday’s newspaper has always
been tomorrow’s historical record,” English writes.291 One publisher
challenged even the word “unpublishing,” arguing that these requests are
actually “asking to censor or rewrite history.” 292
The SPJ’s Code of Ethics specifically addresses the issue of
corrections and updates, suggesting that journalists “consider the longterm implications of the extended reach and permanence of publication,”
and “[p]rovide updated and more complete information as
appropriate.”293 The New York Times takes a restrained approach:
On rare occasions, the Times will add an addendum to crime stories if
the subject contacts the Times to say he or she was acquitted, or that
charges were dropped. The Times only does this for stories involving
major crimes, and it requires the person involved to supply copies of
related legal documents as proof.294

The Times recognizes that publishing corrections represents a more
reasonable alternative than “unpublishing,” but explains that its more
constrained approach is “just a question of resources. . . . [W]e could
spend all of our reporters’ time doing follow-ups to 15-year-old stories.
It’s not what we’re in the business of doing.”295
Other editors have responded, recognizing that even an addendum
might not be enough, instead favoring the publication of follow-up
stories.296As one editor explained, the correction or addendum needs to
be as prominent as the original story.297 “Publishing a follow-up that puts
the correct information on the record and links to the previous article is
288. Unpublish is “a word media organizations have coined to describe public requests to
remove content from news Websites.” Id. at 1.
289. See id. at 1, 3–5 (demonstrating some exemplary ways editors created policies to handle
requests for unpublishing).
290. See id. at 5 (illustrating the growth of such requests over recent years).
291. Id. at 1.
292. Id. at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
293. SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 282 (stressing the need to deliberate on ramifications of
corrections).
294. Mallory Jean Tenore, 5 Ways News Organizations Respond to ‘Unpublishing’ Requests,
POYNTER (July 19, 2010), http://www.poynter.org/2010/5-ways-news-organizations-respond-tounpublishing-requests/104414/.
295. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
296. Id.
297. Id.
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also a means of ensuring ongoing accuracy[.]”298
While not going so far as to support unpublishing on demand, at least
one news outlet, GateHouse Communications, reports that it has
programmed the websites of some of its online outlets to have police
blotter reports “fall off” the websites after six months.299 Such a practice,
a voluntary and automatic purging of certain types of sensitive records,
offers one solution. But if this practice were applied broadly, as would be
necessary to really solve the problems raised here, it would eliminate—
or at least gut—what many recognize as a valuable resource for historical
research: comprehensive media archives.300
Against this background, I propose a modest solution that focuses
exclusively on online publications. I propose that publishers of online
media outlets adopt a voluntary policy of correcting reports of criminal
records that remain available on their websites under certain
circumstances. Based on the New York Times’ approach, but applied more
generously, a workable policy might look like this:
A publisher will publish a brief addendum to its online report of an
individual’s criminal record, provided the original report is still readily
accessible to the public on the publisher’s website, and provided the
individual who is the subject of the online report submits to the publisher
a court order or other law-enforcement-authenticated document
indicating that the individual’s record has been expunged pursuant to an
expungement statute, or that other similar action (such as pardon,
commutation, or even the entry of a certificate of rehabilitation) has
occurred. The updated publication or article should indicate that it has
been amended.
The policy is drafted to apply to online publications for two reasons:
First, as noted above, online publications have virtually unlimited shelflives, and even elderly reports are easily accessible. This magnifies the
harm. Indeed, online publications really represent the heart of the
problem addressed in this Article. Second, while amending online
publications is not cost-free, the expense and burdens are significantly
298. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Tenore discusses how journalistic responsibility to
ensure ongoing accuracy of content published online may require further reporting, especially in
cases involving charges against individuals named in the news. See id.
299. English, supra note 287, at 5. GateHouse Media “publish[es] 125 daily newspapers, more
than 600 community publications and over 555 local market websites. . . . ” About Us, GATEHOUSE
MEDIA, http://www.gatehousemedia.com/about-us/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2017). Such a voluntary
and automatic approach offers an intriguing option. It eliminates the impact of coercion on the
publisher, and is essentially content neutral. However, it undercuts the concept of news reports as
the building blocks of history by erasing entire swaths of information, especially without a view to
specific content.
300. See supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text.
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less than those for print publications, provided the information the
publisher is being asked to report is brief and can be easily verified.
Relying on official documentation will relieve news outlets of the
burden of independently verifying the information provided.301
Requiring that the request come from the subject of the report will ensure
that only the individual involved can refresh the story, as publishing an
addendum necessarily will do. Further, locating the authority to request
an addendum with the individual respects the individual’s autonomy
regarding whether to seek to amend the report or to let it stand.302
Requiring acknowledgement in the publication that the article has been
amended advances the interest of media transparency.303
Finally, I propose publishing only an addendum, and not a fully
developed follow-up story. Developing and reporting a follow-up story
would involve significant time and resources.304 Further, while a
separate, fully developed article might at first blush appear more effective
than an addendum, it actually might not be. A correction in the context of
an online publication will likely appear adjacent or linked to the original
report, and will be brief, easy to find, and easy to read, making it quite
likely that the reader will find and read it. A full-blown story might be
harder to place near the original story and, because of its length, might
not be read, undermining the effectiveness of the remedy.
As noted, as publishers recognize that online content has a long life
and is easy to access; they appear willing to entertain realistic policies to
address this issue fairly and are wrestling with their options.305 Thus,
publishers might be receptive to such a narrowly crafted policy.
CONCLUSION
Many have argued powerfully that, as a culture, we should be more
willing to forgive an individual’s criminal past, especially if that
301. Relying on simply a request for correction without supporting documentation would
require a responsible news outlet to commit substantial staff time to research and verify the
requested correction. See supra note 295 (explaining that it is not economically feasible for news
outlets to devote resources to investigating and correcting old stories).
302. To be sure, the publication could in the exercise of its own editorial discretion decide to
amend the report or publish an addendum. But some third party should not be permitted to do so
except for compelling reasons.
303. See English, supra note 287, at 16 (“Transparency with our readers demands that we
indicate that an article has been edited to correct or update.”).
304. See Tenore, supra note 294 (describing that follow-ups are not always a favored option
even though they allow for more context and background than addendums).
305. See English, supra note 287, at 10–13 (discussing results of survey of newsrooms
regarding unpublishing practices); see also Tenore, supra note 294 (reporting on survey of media
outlets: “newsrooms are just beginning to figure out the various ways of ensuring that content that
lives online remains accurate”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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individual has rehabilitated his or her life.306 Bernard Kogon and Donald
Loughery argue that expungement, which they refer to as “the big lie,”
does more harm than good, and that the better approach is to leave the
record alone and work on changing societal attitudes about offenders.307
True believers in the power of a free and robust media to inform society
(and I count myself among those true believers) would argue that shining
a light on the vast numbers of ordinary people with criminal records will
do much to de-stigmatize individuals with criminal records, blunting the
impact and minimizing the collateral consequences. Unfortunately, such
an overly optimistic vision borders on willful naivety, and sacrifices those
with records as cannon fodder to what would be a futile experiment.
More promising, perhaps, would be broad-based adoption of Judge
Gleeson’s approach to certificates of rehabilitation. As he noted, a formal
proceeding in which the judge reviews the record in detail and makes
findings about an individual’s rehabilitation might provide persuasive
evidence for an employer, landlord, or lender.308 In crafting the certificate
of rehabilitation in the Doe case, Judge Gleeson explained:
[T]he judicial certificate I am awarding Doe will convey to others that
the same court that held Doe accountable for her criminal acts has now
concluded after careful scrutiny that she is rehabilitated. In other words,
the Court is recommending that she be welcomed to participate in
society in the ways the rest of us do.309

Initial research indicates that such instruments can have a positive
effect on lessening the impact of at least some collateral consequences of
a criminal record.310 Such formal acknowledgement of rehabilitation also
works hand in hand with the media policy proposed above.
A number of states provide for certificates of rehabilitation, although

306. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 3d 427, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting that the
forgiveness model is gaining favor in the reentry community for philosophical and practical
reasons); Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Developments at the
State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 378 (2016) (describing recent movement
in favor of expanding forgiveness remedies); see generally Bernard Kogon & Donald. L. Loughery,
Jr., Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records—The Big Lie, 61 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 378 (1970) (arguing that until community bias against offenders is “uprooted, real
correctional rehabilitation will remain effectively crippled”).
307. Kogon, supra note 306, at 388.
308. See Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 442–45 (describing how prospective employers do not have
time to get a full understanding without the certificate); see also Love, supra note 16, at 792
(discussing the value of judicial certification of a person’s rehabilitation as compared to an
administrative board).
309. Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 445.
310. See Leasure, supra note 3, at 13 (suggesting from an empirical study that certificates of
relief may be an effective avenue for reducing the stigma of a criminal record for ex-offenders
seeking employment).
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the federal system has no formal process for this.311 While this remedy
might seem promising, its effectiveness relies on society’s willingness to
be persuaded by the recitation of rehabilitation. Further, the sheer volume
of individuals who might seek certificates might simply overwhelm an
already taxed system.312 Finally, the vast majority of individuals with
criminal records are indigent and do not have the funds to hire counsel to
navigate the expungement process.313
Which of course, brings us back to the problem of over-criminalization
and its devastating consequences that, once unleashed, defy efforts to
constrain its havoc. Only genuine criminal justice reform can address the
essence of the problem. In the absence of that, this modest proposal of
voluntary correction offers little more than a make-shift effort to
minimize the damage in the shadow of a much larger crisis—a crisis
society ignores at its peril.

311. See Doe, 168 F. Supp. 3d at 442 (noting “certificates of rehabilitation are largely a product
of the state system”); id. at 445 (discussing how “[t]he federal system has much to gain from
adopting a certification system” and that “[t]he federal system already contemplates certificates of
rehabilitation”).
312. See David J. Norman, Stymied by the Stigma of a Criminal Conviction: Connecticut and
the Struggle to Relieve Collateral Consequences, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 985, 1028 (2013) (asking
how legal systems should handle “hundreds of thousands” who leave prison and re-enter society).
313. See, e.g., Lorna Collier, Incarceration Nation, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. (Oct. 2014),
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration.aspx (describing how most prisoners are
indigent); see generally MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE (W.S. Hein
2006) (discussing the issues associated with expungement).

